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          Abstract 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the enabling role that agent based 
simulation plays in business and policy. The aforementioned issue has been addressed in 
this dissertation through three distinct, but related essays. The first essay is a literature 
review of different research applications of agent based simulation in various business 
disciplines, such as finance, economics, information systems, management, marketing 
and accounting. Various agent based simulation tools to develop computational models 
are discussed. The second essay uses an agent-based simulation approach to study 
important properties of the widely used most popular news recommender systems (NRS). 
This essay highlights the major limitations of most popular NRS in terms of: (i) 
susceptibility towards manipulation and (ii) unduly penalizing the article which may have 
“just” missed making the cutoff in most popular list. A probabilistic variant of 
recommendation has been introduced as an alternative to most popular list. Classical 
results from urn models are used to derive theoretical results for special cases, and to 
study specific properties of the probabilistic recommender. In addition to simulations, 
various statistical methodologies are used, such as regression based methodologies as part 
of a broader decision analysis tool. The third essay views firms as agents in building 
regression based empirical models to investigate the impact of outsourcing on firms.  
Using an economy wide panel data of outsourcing expenses of firms, the third essay first 
viii 
 
investigates the value addition by the IT backgrounds of project owners in managing IT 
related projects. Then it investigates the impact of peer-pressure on a firm’s outsourcing 
behavior. 
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Chapter 1 : Dissertation Overview 
Agent based models (ABMs) are used to emulate sophisticated computational and 
behavioral phenomena. Due to limitations of traditional econometric models and the 
‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium’ models to capture extreme events such as 
financial crises, agent based models have been used as a methodology to simulate 
economic phenomena (Farmer et al. 2009). This dissertation research explores the use of 
agent based modeling techniques to address various business and policy issues.  
Overview of the Three Essays 
The first essay positions the dissertation work based on a literature review of 
agent-based models in business. To understand the current state of the art in agent based 
simulations in business, articles using agent based simulation as a research methodology, 
were reviewed. The literature survey presents various research work related to agent 
based models in finance and economics, information systems, management, marketing 
and accounting. The computational approaches used to address different research 
questions are discussed. Developing an agent based model requires representing agent 
behavior, interaction and its environment through computer programs. Hence a summary 
of different development platforms and platform specific requirements of programming 
knowledge are also discussed. 
The second essay examines an application of agent-based simulation in news 
recommender systems (NRS). The motivation for the work in online news recommenders 
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is to introduce a manipulation resistant NRS. In particular, this essay investigates the 
different properties of the “most popular” (or most emailed) NRS - widely used by most 
of the media websites. Through simulation this essay shows that whereas 
recommendation of the   most read articles is easily susceptible to manipulation, a 
simple probabilistic variant is more robust to common manipulation strategies.  
In the context of NRS, manipulation can be understood as an act of a person (or 
group of person), when they try to artificially inflate the counts (or clicks) of a target 
article of their interest. This problem has been well recognized in the case of 
recommender systems (Weber 2010; Lerman 2007).  
To address the main limitations that were identified, the second essay presents a 
probabilistic NRS. Probabilistic recommendation of articles is based on probabilistic 
sampling without replacement for   articles. The probability that an article will be 
recommended at any given time step is proportional to the count it has received thus far.    
This research shows that for the “  most popular” recommender, probabilistic 
selection has many desirable properties. Specifically, the (   )   article, which may 
have “just” missed making the cutoff, is unduly penalized under common user models. 
Small differences initially are easily amplified – an observation that can be used by 
manipulators. Probabilistic selection on the other hand, creates no such artificial penalty. 
Further, every article will have some chance to appear in the recommended list in the 
probabilistic NRS. Classical results from urn models have been used to derive theoretical 
results for special cases and to study specific properties of the probabilistic recommender. 
The urn models used for analytical derivations are namely, Pólya’s and Bernard 
Friedman’s urn models (Freedman 1965). The trade-off between the Top-N NRS and 
 3 
 
proposed probabilistic variant has been discussed in terms of count distortion and 
information quality
1
. Finally, results on manipulation for the probabilistic NRS in 
comparison with an “adapted” influence limiter heuristic (Resnick and Sami, 2007), has 
been discussed. 
Further, data from a local news website DailyMe Inc. has been obtained to 
determine the popularity distribution of articles. The data provided listed specific articles 
along with cookie IDs and time stamps read across the five different local news websites. 
The distribution generated through this dataset has been used to complement the findings 
from simulation results.  
It has also been noted that the probabilistic mechanism proposed in the second 
essay has one limitation that it sometimes could pick (with low probability) articles that 
are not popular. It has been shown that a novel solution to this is through a class of 
probabilistic NRS with feedback.  
The third essay of dissertation which views firms as agents, investigates the 
impact of outsourcing contracts as well as the impact of IT background of project leaders 
on firms through various financial measures such as operating expenses, overhead 
(selling, general & administrative) expenses and profitability. While the IT backgrounds 
of project owners result in bringing down expenses, projects managed by executives with 
non-IT backgrounds improved firm profitability. IT systems integration outsourcing 
projects during the period of 1995 – 2010 in US market, is used to establish these 
findings. 
                                                          
1
 Counts of articles has been assumed as the surrogate measure of quality 
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Further, a herding model of outsourcing behavior among firms has been 
developed. This herding model builds on the Information-based Theory of business 
imitation (Lieberman et al. 2006), and is operationalized using a two-step regression 
model. The impact of peer pressure and profit-margin on firms to undertake outsourcing 
activities is modeled in the first-step of the regression model. The estimated outsourcing 
decision from the first step is then used to predict overhead expenses of firms in the 
second step of regression. The effects of imitative behavior and profit margin are 
mediated through the action taken by a firm, on its overhead expenses. The use of peer-
pressure to model outsourcing behaviors of firms, is a unique contribution to the 
outsourcing literature. Data on outsourcing contracts of firms in the automotive sector 
signed during the period of: 1995 – 2010 is used for analysis. Finally, this essay 
concludes with discussing the research opportunities related with representing 
outsourcing behavior of firms through ABM perspective. 
References 
Chou, C. L.-y., Du, T., and Lai, V. S. 2007. "Continuous auditing with a multi-agent 
system," Decision Support Systems (42:4), pp 2274-2292.  
Farmer, J. D., and Foley, D. 2009. "The economy needs agent-based modelling," Nature 
(460:7256), pp 685-686. 
Lieberman, M. B., and Asaba, S. 2006. "Why do firms imitate each other?," Academy of 
Management Review (31:2), pp 366-385. 
Freedman, D. A. 1965. Bernard Friedman's Urn. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 
volume 36(3): 956-970. 
Lerman, K., 2007. User participation in social media: Digg study. In Proceedings of the 
2007 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and 
Intelligent Agent Technology, pages 255–258.  
Lieberman, M. B., and Asaba, S. 2006. "Why do firms imitate each other?," Academy of 
Management Review (31:2), pp 366-385. 
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Recommender Systems. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Recommender 
Systems (RecSys07).  
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Chapter 2 : A Survey of Agent Based Simulation in Business 
Introduction 
The rapid growth in computing resources has caused a dramatic shift in the way 
research is conducted in many fields of study. A case in point, analytical modeling has 
limitations in terms of capturing rich details related to model dynamics. However, 
simulation modeling can address some of these shortcomings especially in the context of 
complex behaviors and systems that require analysis of multiple interdependent processes 
(Harrison, Carroll, & Carley, 2007).  
ABM can offer a specific kind of computational simulation for complex business 
situations. ABM is based on the notion that the whole of many systems is greater or more 
complex than the simple sum of its constituents called agents (North and Macal 2007). It 
is a tool to simulate complex systems for the purpose of studying emergent behaviors 
(Bonabeau 2007). Agent-based models are specified using either equations or rules, or 
both. It focuses on modeling the behavior of adaptive actors who make up a social (or 
complex) system. The process of viewing organizations as agent based systems can 
provide valuable insights into emergent behaviors. It also provides the flexibility to 
generate and experiment with various ‘if-then’ conditions. 
Agents are autonomous decision making entities that can make assessment of 
situations in making decisions. Agents may change or evolve, allowing unanticipated 
behaviors to emerge. Their decision is determined through a given set of rules 
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(Bonabeau, 2002). At the simplest level, ABM represents agents and the relationships 
among them. However, sophisticated models may incorporate learning and adaptation 
behavior of agents through evolutionary techniques (Bonabeau, 2002). The development 
of agent based models is usually grounded on empirical data that provide broad 
parameters for the simulation.  
Agents operate in an environment where the interactions among them lead to 
observed phenomena known as the emergent behavior. Usually, the environment and 
behavior of agents are generated in simulation through statistical distributions observed 
in data. The emergence of computational social science is based on the use of ABM in 
economics, sociology, business and political science.  
In particular, the focus in this essay is on the use of ABM and its precursor, the 
computer simulation models in business domains. To understand the current state of the 
art of ABM research in business, we reviewed the following major representative 
journals in each of the following fields: Finance and Economics, Accounting, 
Management Information Systems, Marketing, and Management. The list of sample 
journals include (but not limited):  MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, 
Management Science, Decision Support System, Journal of Management Information 
System, Organization Science, Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of 
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Strategic Management Journal, 
The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Accounting Organizations and Society, Journal of Marketing, Marketing 
Science, American Economic Review and Quantitative Finance. Some other outlets were 
also searched especially for ABM in Finance and Economics. In the following sections 
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few ABM research examples in each field are presented in detail. Finally, we conclude 
with a discussion on the platforms for implementing ABM. 
Finance and Economics 
In recent years there have been major developments in agent-based simulation to 
represent various phenomena in economics. An agent-based software platform called 
EURACE
2
 has been developed for the simulation of the European economy for 
optimizing the impact of regulatory decisions. Another example is Minsky
3
, a software 
program for designing monetary macroeconomic models.  
In economics research, the major limitations of efficient market hypotheses and 
rational expectations assumptions (Lo, 2004; The Economist 2010), can be overcome by 
ABM. Also, traditional and analytical modeling approaches in economics fail to capture 
events related to crisis situations. ABM has been suggested as an approach to model 
crisis and early-warning systems (Farmer et al. 2009; The Economist 2010). Whereas in 
traditional economic models, interactions among agents take place indirectly through 
pricing, in ABM direct interactions among agents can be modeled. Further, ABM does 
not assume equilibrium in an economy. Large scale projects such as Eurace, CRISIS and 
FuturICT have used ABM to model (Iori & Porter, 2012).  
ABM has been extensively used in financial economics. Suggestions have been 
made regarding modeling financial markets as various possible simulation outcomes 
similar to traffic forecasting models (Iori & Porter, 2012).  
With the use of ABMs, the theoretical assumptions related to equilibrium 
conditions have been replaced by less restrictive assumptions requiring agents to have 
                                                          
2 www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/01/remaking-macro-0 
3
 www.sourceforge.net/projects/minsky 
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bounded rationality, where they adapt to market forces. Agents may also use technical 
rules such as artificial neural networks to forecast. In the finance literature, agents have 
been represented in many forms ranging from passive automatons with no intelligence 
and to data gathering decision-makers with sophisticated learning capabilities (Iori & 
Porter, 2012).  
There are some excellent reviews of research on ABM in finance and economics 
(Chakraborti et al., 2011; Iori & Porter, 2012). A critical review of ABMs in Economics 
has been presented by Cristelli et al (2011).  
Cristelli et al. (2011) discuss why and how ABM advance the understanding of 
the dynamics and the statistical properties of financial markets beyond the classical 
theory of economics. In this review Cristelli et al. (2011) discuss eight different agent 
based models in the field of economics. These models are as follows:  
Kim and Markowitz Model: Kim et al. (1989), who were first to recognize the 
potential of ABM in finance, presented a model to explain Black Monday. Their findings 
are based on discrete event simulation of stock market. 
Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market (Tesfatsion & Judd, 2006): An artificial stock 
market developed by researchers at Santa Fe to investigate market trends in the presence 
of heterogeneous forecasting strategy of agents. 
Minority Game (Challet et al. 1998): One of most widely studied strategies in 
finance in which agents receive payoff if their strategies belong to the minority side in a 
game. 
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Caldarelli, Marsili and Zhang: Caldarelli et al. (1997) show that endogenous 
mechanisms of financial markets are sufficient to obtain a stable and self-organized 
market. 
Lux and Marchesi: Lux et al. (1999) show that the scaling laws observed in 
financial markets could be generated through agents’ mutual interaction.  
Giardina and Bouchad:  Giardina et al. (2003) have introduced a model on the 
tractability of Minority Games and the Santa Fe virtual stock market. 
The destabilizing effect of leverage: Thurner et al. (2012) show the phenomena of 
fat tails and volatility clustering as a result of leverage and margin calls.  
Credit network and bankrupt avalanches: Gatti et al. (2009) study the property of 
a credit network and the causes of the emergence of bankruptcy avalanches.  
Based on findings from the aforementioned models, Cristelli et al. (2011) have 
made suggestions regarding open questions, and highlight under-researched issues such 
as non-stationarity and self-organization in the context of financial markets. Farmer and 
Foley (2009) have pointed out the limitations of econometric models and ‘Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium’ models in terms of making strong assumptions such as 
perfect world and minimal deviation in the future from the current state. Hence these 
models by design, fail to capture the great changes during financial crises (such as the 
financial crisis that started in the last quarter of 2007).  Farmer and Foley (2009) also 
point out that most mathematical models in practice are used to calculate potential profit 
and risk of individual trades without assembling the various pieces to understand the 
whole economic systems. In light of aforementioned limitations of current modeling 
practices, ABM has been suggested to capture the wider range of non-linear behavior, 
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and to simulate an artificial economy under different policy scenarios (Farmer & Foley, 
2009).  
One of the earliest research in finance, related to the use of ABM is in behavioral 
finance, where traders are represented as agents encompassing trader behavior through 
psychological or sociological properties. LeBaron (2006) has provided an overview of the 
use of these classes of models. However, utility functions defined in these models are not 
necessarily true representation of reality.  
Cont and Bouchaud (2000) have introduced the concept of noise traders who form 
random clusters of traders sharing similar outlook on financial markets (termed as 
herding). This idea has been further explored in later research. ABMs have been 
categorized into two categories (Chakraborti et al. 2011): (a) order-driven models and 
kinetic-theory for wealth distribution and (b) game theoretic modeling. Below we discuss 
such research in each of these categories (Chakraborti et al., 2011).  
Order driven models and the kinetic-theory of wealth distribution.  Chiarella 
and Iori (2002) have built an ABM where different types of traders submit orders based 
on different strategies: chartist, fundamentalist and noise traders. Orders are considered 
as particles moving along a price-line, where each collision is a transaction (Chakraborti 
et al., 2011). In these models, orders are viewed as an arriving flow, whose properties are 
determined by empirically observing the trading mechanism, thus leading to phenomena 
called ‘Stylized Facts’ i.e., empirical properties that could be observed on a large number 
of market orders (Chakraborti et al., 2011). Findings based on stylized facts lead to the 
concept of ‘zero-intelligence traders’ (ZI). The expression of ZI traders is described by 
Gode and Sunder (1993). These traders are termed as ZI traders because they have no 
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intelligence, do not seek to maximize profits, and do not have learning capability or 
memory.  
Caldarelli, Marsili, and Zhang (1997) present traders’ strategies and speculation 
on endogenous price fluctuation, using a prototype model of stock market interaction 
among traders without external influences. The model generates realistic price histories 
that have statistical properties similar to those observed in the real world. LiCalzi and 
Pellizzari (2003) present ABM of market dynamics based on structural assumptions that 
represent trading mechanism, and behavioral assumptions of traders. Findings by LiCalzi 
and Pellizzari (2003) support the hypotheses that statistical properties of financial time 
series are due to the microstructure of the stock market. 
Lux and Marchesi (1999) have developed a multi-agent model of financial 
markets involving two groups of traders, namely, fundamentalist and noise traders (or 
chartist). Fundamentalist follows the strategy based on efficient market hypothesis, and 
expect price to follow discounted sums of expected future earnings. This strategy consists 
of buying or selling assets, when prices are perceived to be below or above the 
fundamental value of assets. Noise traders on the other hand, identify price trends and 
patterns, and consider behavior of other traders, thereby, gravitating towards herding 
behavior. Their model supports the notion that the scaling laws in finance arise from 
mutual interaction of agents with heterogeneous beliefs and strategies, and that 
alternation between tranquil and turbulent period is a result of changes in membership of 
groups (Lux & Marchesi, 1999).  
LeBaron (2006) has described the development of the Santa Fe Artificial Stock 
Market used to understand the behavior of environments having evolving trader behavior 
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(Tesfatsion et al., 2006). Agents use a classifier system to estimate the returns. The 
classifier is based on a number of properties, which in turn are mapped to different 
parameters. Periodically, the worst set of classifier rules are removed and replaced with 
new rules generated by a genetic algorithm (GA). The model has been able to reproduce 
many empirical phenomena observed in financial returns such as: excess kurtosis, low 
linear autocorrelation and volatility clustering. Some of the later developments in this 
stream include: Chiarella & Iori(2002) and LeBaron & Yamamoto(2007). 
Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) have reported the statistical analysis of the Island 
ECN order book. They analyze the static and dynamic properties of the system by 
treating orders as massive particles, and price as the position of the particles. Cont and 
Bouchaud (2000) have been able to generate excess kurtosis of financial returns while 
representing traders, who imitate each other, using agents. The theoretical foundation 
provided them has guided many subsequent research in ABM in finance. For example, 
Feng, et al. (2012) have constructed an ABM to quantitatively demonstrate that “fat tails” 
in return distributions arise when traders share similar technical trading strategies and 
decisions. 
Mike and Farmer (2008) have developed a behavioral model for liquidity and 
volatility based on empirical regularities in trading flow in the London Stock Exchange. 
In this empirical study involving a group of stocks the authors observe that large 
fluctuations of absolute returns behave as per, power law.   
Cont (2007) has also proposed a simple ABM that links variations in market 
activity to threshold behavior of market participants, thereby leading to the phenomena of 
volatility clustering and investor inertia. They define volatility clustering as large changes 
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in prices that tend to cluster together, resulting in the persistence of amplitudes of price 
changes. Due to the simplicity of the model, the origins of volatility clustering are 
traceable to the agent behaviors. 
Using maximum likelihood estimation in the context of ABM, Lux (2012) has 
produced abrupt changes of mood in short-run sentiment, and slower changes in medium-
term sentiment, where the influence of social interaction is less pronounced. 
Tedeschi, Iori, and Gallegati (2012) have introduced an order driven model with 
heterogeneous agents that imitate each other on a dynamic network. They implement an 
endogenous mechanism of imitation using ‘preferential attachment’, such that each trader 
is imitated by others with a probability proportional to its profit. The mechanism of link 
formation allows the authors to investigate assumptions under which the most successful 
traders endogenously rise and fall over time, as well as the imitation effects on asset 
prices and the distribution of agents’ wealth.  
Treating each agent as a gas molecule, and each trade as an elastic or money-
conserving two-body collision, Chatterjee et al. (2004), have simulated an Ideal Gas 
Model of trading markets. They introduce agent heterogeneity using saving propensity of 
agents. Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti (2009) have developed a framework based on 
microeconomic theory from which ideal gas like market models can be represented. They 
introduce a kinetic exchange to model N-agent exchange economy, where agents have 
same statistical properties. 
Game theoretic models. Challet and Zhang (1997) have introduced and analyzed 
binary games where N players have to choose one of the two sides independently and 
those on the minority side win – hence the game is termed as ‘minority game’. This 
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model also incorporates the notion of bounded rationality among players, as they are 
allowed to make decisions based on finite set of ad-hoc strategies based on the past 
record. The analyzing power of agents is limited and can adapt when necessary. The 
approach of Challet and Zhang (1997) has been one of the earliest efforts in modeling 
emerging intelligence and cooperation among agents in a society through ABM.  In an 
extension, Challet and Zhang (1998) have analyzed the ability of players to learn a given 
payoff. They introduce the concept of Darwinism to allow worst player to be replaced by 
a clone of the best.  
Vriend (2000) has demonstrated the difference between individual and social 
learning through an example of a standard Cournot oligopoly game. Each individual firm 
does not know what the optimal output level is, which, it needs to learn. This problem has 
been modeled through a GA. The GA has been implemented in two ways. In the first 
implementation, the GA is used to model social or population learning, in which firms 
look around and tend to imitate and re-combine ideas of other firms that appear to be 
successful. The more successful the selection rules are, the more likely they are to be 
selected for the process of imitation and re-combination, where the measure of success is 
the profits generated by reach rule. In the second implementation, GA has been used to 
model individual learning. In individual learning, each individual selects a rule based on 
its fitness. The rules that had been more successful recently, are more likely to be chosen. 
Hence instead of looking how well other firms with different rules were doing, in the 
individual rule, firms check how well it had been doing in past, when these rules were 
used. Vriend (2000) found that social learning produced a much higher average output 
than individual learning.  
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Sysi-Aho et al. (2004) introduced an adaptation mechanism based on genetic 
algorithms to model minority games. when agents find their performances too low, they 
modify their strategies to improve their performances and to become more successful. 
The authors observed that adaptation results in competition among agents that in turn 
pulled the collective system into a state where the aggregate utility was the largest.  
Another example of modeling games is the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. Which is a 
repeated game played between a large numbers of agents having no interaction among 
themselves (Chakraborti et al., 2011). Prospective agents choose from N restaurants 
simultaneously on a given day. Each restaurant has different rank but the same price for a 
meal and can serve only one agent. Information regarding distributions of agents on the 
previous day is available, as each agent try to choose a restaurant with highest possible 
rank, while avoiding the crowd. If multiple agents arrive at any restaurant on any day, 
then one among them is chosen randomly, and rests are not served (Chakraborti et al., 
2011).   
From simple zero intelligence (randomly behaving) agents, ABM of financial 
markets has evolved to modeling using sophisticated agents with micro foundations. The 
cases where zero intelligence agents may perform poorly are situations where agents have 
opportunities for learning, along with feedback loops between agents’ action and the state 
of environment (Ladley, 2012). The research on considering the financial system as 
network, which is still in early stage, can help address various important issues related to 
optimal network design of banking systems. (Iori & Porter, 2012).  
Chen (2012) discusses the origins of agent-based computational economics from 
markets, cellular-automata, tournaments and experimental-economics perspectives. The 
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market origin has its roots in the competitive general equilibrium model proposed by 
Leon Walras, whose work inspired the Paris Stock Exchange. The notion to displace the 
Walrasian auctioneer by a decentralized process has been a major motivation for using 
ABM in economics. Building on the notion of simple agents, autonomous agents have 
been introduced and ecologically constructed. The tournament origin has been a 
precursor to autonomous agents. Recent attempts have been made to use human-like 
agents that have personality, emotions and cultural backgrounds, in economics research 
studies. 
Economic policies. Poledna (2011) has provided recent examples of ABM for 
economic policies development. A notable work in this field is by Thurner et al. (2012), 
where they build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. It has 
been shown that fat tails and clustered volatility are results of leverage limits that cause 
funds to sell in a falling market instead of “irrational behavior” of traders. Haber (2002) 
presented a macroeconomic ABM of national economy by simulating both private and 
public sector. Households, companies and government agencies are treated as separate 
agents in the formation of fiscal and monetary policy.  
The Tobin Tax is usually imposed on all foreign exchange transactions which 
should discourage short term speculation while leaving longer term investors relatively 
unaffected to reduce market volatility (Iori & Porter, 2012). Mannaro, et al. (2008) have 
examined the effects of Tobin Tax on foreign exchange and stock markets, using an 
artificial financial market based on heterogeneous agents. Through simulation findings, 
authors have found that the tax actually increases volatility and decreases trading volume.  
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Recently Geanakoplos et al. (2012) have developed an ABM of housing markets 
with individual data from greater Washington DC area. Their findings suggest that 
housing boom and bust of 1997-2007 was largely driven by leverage. Their model 
consists of every household of the economy, with tremendous heterogeneity. 
Calibration of agent-based models for financial markets. A critical guide to 
empirical validation of ABM has been discussed by Fagiolo, Moneta, and Windrum 
(2007). A detailed survey on major approaches for empirical validation of agent-based 
models has also been discussed. The artificial data should be compared with real data and 
the structural parameters of the model should be tuned in such a way that simulated data 
imitates real data (Iori & Porter, 2012). The method of simulated moments has been 
suggested as a possible solution of this problem. To deal with validation and estimation 
of agent based models by means of simulation methods based on actual data, Gilli and 
Winker (2003) have proposed a continuous global optimization heuristic. The estimation 
results of some parameters for a standard ABM of the DM/US-$ exchange rate has been 
also discussed. Using the CEBI database for Italian firms, Bianchi et al. (2007) have 
discussed validation experiments for ABM. Initial setup and the model parameters have 
been estimated using actual data. Ex-post validation of simulation results with respect to 
actual data point to, the success of agent-based models in reproducing the observed 
reality. In another example, Mike and Farmer (2008) have developed a simple ABM for 
trading order flow in the London Stock Exchange in which, all components of the model 
are validated against real data. This model of order flow has been used to simulate price 
formulation under a continuous double auction. The model is developed based on a single 
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stock and then tested on 25 stocks. The predictive capability of this model was good for 
low volatility and small tick size stocks.  
Information Systems 
Broadly, agents have been used in Information Systems in application areas such 
as auctions, organizational IT-use, software engineering and network driven phenomena. 
In one of the earlier works, Chari (2000) presented an overview of software agents, agent 
applications and research opportunities in the information systems domain, where 
software agents were defined as a collection of computer programs that act on behalf of 
some entity and have some intelligence. In Chari (2000), software agents were 
categorized as automation agents, information agents, transaction agents, workflow 
management systems and monitoring & control agents.  The use of software agents in 
different contexts has been also discussed by Chou et al. (2007). In the remaining part of 
this section, specific works in different areas of information systems have been discussed.  
Software agents. One context in which agents have been studied in information 
systems is the concept of software agents that work on behalf of users. While some of the 
papers in this area focus on intelligent agents that can perform tasks based on learning 
user preference, others in this area deal with multiple interacting agents, that is closer to 
traditional agent-based simulations. 
 Yang et al. (2000) discuss the development of intelligent internet search agents 
based on hybrid simulated annealing, where an intelligent search agent refers a search 
engine that has the capability to make adjustments according to the progress in searching 
and to generate personalized results according to users’ preferences. 
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An agent based recommender system for web search has been proposed by 
Birukov et al. (2005). Agents use data mining techniques in order to learn and discover 
user behavior, as they interact with other agents to share knowledge about their users. 
The improvement in performance of the overall search engine has been demonstrated 
through experimental results. 
Du et al. (2005) have proposed a framework for using mobile agents to highlight 
the autonomous behavior of firms in the e-marketplace in terms of allowing corporate 
data to be maintained by local buyers and sellers. They discuss findings based on 
simulation design to explore the performance of mobile agents in different product-
purchasing policies. The advantages of agents have been discussed in terms of 
aggregating orders and shortening the execution time. 
Wainer et al. (2007) present a set of protocols for scheduling a meeting among 
agents that represent their respective user’s interest. Multi-agent scheduling systems have 
been used to present simulation results for different protocols. 
A model for software agents that can automate negotiations by allowing agents to 
learn from bidding behavior of opponents has been presented by Chari et al. (2007). In 
this research, agents’ behaviors have been modeled through a multi-issue heuristic 
(MILH). The simulation results indicate that software agents can replicate the behavior of 
human negotiators. 
To analyze and understand a dynamic power change in the US wholesale 
electricity market, Sueyoshi et al. (2008) have developed an intelligent decision making 
tool MAIS, based on agent-based systems. The software uses probabilistic reasoning and 
reinforcement learning to assess different trading strategies in a competitive electricity 
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trading environment. Market entities such as generators, wholesalers, market 
administrator, network operator and policy regulator have been represented as software 
agents in the system.  
Lau et al. (2008) have modeled intelligent software agents that use a probabilistic 
decision making mechanism in a simulated e-market place for negotiation. They show 
that probabilistic negotiation agents empowered with knowledge discovery mechanisms 
are more effective and efficient than Pareto optimal negotiation agents in e-market 
places.  
Nunamaker et al. (2011) have proposed an IT artifact called Embodied 
Conversational Agent – based kiosk for automated interviewing based on detecting 
changes in arousal, behavior and cognitive effort. Software agents use heterogeneous 
sensors to detect human physiology and behavior during interactions. They have argued 
that these agent-based systems make knowledge-based recommendations and exhibit 
human characteristics such as rationality, intelligence, autonomy and environmental 
perception (Nunamaker et al. 2011). Recent works in the context of negotiation agents 
include: Lin et al. (2013); Ren et al. (2013). 
 Auction. Auction mechanisms where potential buyers place competitive bids on 
assets and services have been widely studied in economics traditionally, but more 
recently in information systems, where computational models are used for studying 
auctions, have been an active area of research. With the advent of internet, bidders often 
partcipate in auctions online without being physically present at the auction site. Bapna, 
Goes, and Gupta (2003) used multiagent-based simulations to present a relatively risk-
free and cost-effective environment to both bid takers and bid makers in a web based 
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dynamic price setting process. The optimization of bid taker revenues and welfare 
implications have been considered in model development. The simulation is based on 
theoretical revenue generating properties, with simulation parameters instantiated using 
real online auctions. The authors justify the simulation approach, as a test bed for design 
choices of auctioneers and bidding strategy of bidders.  
Mehta and Bhattacharyya (2006) present design, development and validation 
methodologies of an agent-based model for B2C electronic auctions. The model involves 
incorporating the behavior of an auctioneer, consumer and retailer, and the environment 
in which agents operate. The simulation based approach provides additional insights on 
market characteristics such as alternative distribution of posted prices, demand for items, 
and degree of product differentiation in market, as well as consumer characteristics and 
auction parameters.  
Jones et al. (2006) have used agent-based simulation of the market for television 
advertising slots in order to analyze an e-market design that allows multiple market 
segments to be served simultaneously with a single rule-based combinatorial auction. 
Other notable research involving agent-based approaches in auction include Avenali et al. 
(2007) and Gregg et al. (2006).  Descriptions of electronic market simulators have been 
provided by Fasli et al. (2008).  
Adomavicius, Gupta, and Zhdanov (2009) have discussed analytical, 
computational, and empirical analysis of strategies for intelligent bid formulation that 
provide opaque feedback information to bidders, and present a challenge in formulating 
appropriate bids. Software agents have been used in making bids in the presence of 
limited information provided by the mechanism. In the context of multi-item auction, 
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Bichler, Shabalin, and Pikovsky (2009) benchmark different iterative combinatorial 
auctions and design, and analyze new auction rules for auctions and pseudo-dual linear 
prices using a simulation model.  
Recently, Guo, Jank, and Rand (2011) have proposed an ABM that simulates 
bidders with different bidding strategies, and their interactions with others. The model 
has been calibrated by matching the emerging simulated price process with that of the 
observed auction data using a genetic algorithm. The proposed methodology has been 
applied in the context of eBay auctions for digital cameras.  
Greenwald, Kannan, and Krishnan (2010) have developed a partially observable 
Markov decision process model of supplier bidding behavior, and use a multi-agent e-
market simulation to analyze the effects of complete and incomplete information policies 
on the expected price paid by the procurer. The information revelation policies have been 
developed using ideas from the multi-agents literature, the machine learning literature, 
and the economics literature. 
Social networks. Chang, Oh, Pinsonneault, and Kwon (2010) have used ABM to 
investigate the outcome of strategic alliances between two smaller online search engines 
competing with a dominant market leader in settings where an advertiser’s decision is 
based on the result of network influence, and the advertiser’s individual preferences. The 
ABM consists of modeling agents’ (advertisers) behavior in response to the environment 
(strategic alliances). Influence relationships between online advertisers have been 
modeled through three types of network: scale free, small world and random. The 
findings suggest that in the presence of network influence and cascading effects, an 
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alliance with near half market share could compete with a leader with majority market 
share.  
 Organizational use of IT. In one of the earliest research in Information Systems 
on modeling humans and their interactions in a team as objects in a computerized 
environment, Rao et al. (1995) have developed computer programs to model decision 
systems and team processes drawing ideas from team theory, informational processing 
and social choice paradigms. Extending on the coordination framework provided by this 
research, Raghu et al. (2004) present an approach to organizational modeling that 
combines both agent-centric and activity-centric approaches. The agent-centric approach 
captures specific aspects of the human component.  
Nan (2011) has presented a theory-building approach through modeling collective 
level information technology (IT) use patterns from a bottoms-up approach. ABM has 
been introduced as a tool for computationally representing IT use process into three 
interrelated elements: agents in an IT use process, interactions related with mutually 
adaptive agent-behavior, and the environment of organizational IT use. 
Open source software. In the software engineering context, Oh and Jeon (2007) 
have investigated the basic pattern of interactions among open source software (OSS) 
community from the Ising theory perspective – widely used in physics. The model has 
been implemented using simulation, treating OSS community members as agents on 
empirical data collected from two OSS communities. They conclude that: (1) 
membership herding is highly present when external influences are weak, but decreases 
when external influences increase, (2) propensity of membership herding is most likely to 
be seen in a large network with random connectivity, and (3) in large networks, when 
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external influences are weak, random connectivity result in higher network strength than 
scale-free connectivity.  
Zaffar et al. (2011) have proposed a framework that investigates a broad range of 
social and economic factors on the diffusion dynamics of open source software using an 
agent based computational economics approach. The authors illustrate the impact of key 
variables such as: license, support and interoperability costs, frequency of upgrades and 
interactions with firms on the diffusion dynamics. 
Simulation as a Decision Support Tool. Valluri et al. (2005) have used an agent-
based model to study game theoretic supplier selection, where neither the suppliers nor 
the buyers possess full information. Agents have been used to model suppliers who learn 
to produce at optimal levels through a pre-specified system of rewards and punishments 
administered by the buyer. Supporting their findings both theoretically and through a 
Japanese automotive-market the authors conclude that it is optimal for buyers to transact 
with relatively few suppliers.  
Wang et al. (2007) discuss a multi-agent simulation method to simulate 
heterogeneous project-team coordination and argue that it is a valid decision support tool 
for IT investment decisions. Their simulation model is based on a theoretical framework, 
and is validated using a real world case from plastic tooling industry. 
The phenomena of knowledge sharing in an organization is analyzed by Wang et 
al. (2009), using an agent based model. In particular, they simulate employee knowledge 
sharing behaviors by making parametric assumptions on employee decision strategies and 
organizational interventions. Authors have also argued that agent-based approaches can 
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be combined with data mining to develop management analysis tool to study 
organizational knowledge sharing.  
Agent based simulation has also been used to assess the relative performance of 
reinforcement learning systems (Gaines et al. 2013). The classifier systems have been 
implemented in the context of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Agent based modeling in operations management and supply chain. The 
computational model to capture the components of a supply chain has been implemented 
by Strader et al. (1998) using multi-agent simulation. This model studies the impact of 
information sharing on order fulfillment in divergent assembly supply chains.  The 
authors have also argued that simulation is the most appropriate tool to study processes 
such as supply chains that exhibit decentralized command and control.  
Kim (2009) has introduced the notion of modeling supply chain as complex 
adaptive systems, where firms (or agents) interact with one another and adapt themselves. 
A social factor, trust, is used in modeling an agents’ behavior.  
In other notable examples, Liang et al. (2006) have developed a multi-agent 
system to simulate a supply chain where agents operate with different inventory systems, 
while Kim et al. (2010) have used agent negotiations to allocate orders to participants for 
supply chain formation.  
The use of simulation based approaches to model games in operations 
management has been discussed by Van Der Zee et al. (2012). Lovric et al. (2012) have 
studied revenue management for public transport operators through agent-based 
modeling. The modeling approach of Lovric et al. (2012) has been evaluated using real 
world smart card transaction data. 
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Organization and Management 
Though a popular research methodology in physical and social sciences, 
simulation historically was under-represented in management research, primarily because 
simulation methods were not well understood. Recently though, about 8% of journal 
articles have used simulation methodology (Harrison et al. 2007). 
In this chapter, the discussion on organizational research is restricted to agent-
based models, in particular efforts related to genetic algorithms, NK model, and cellular 
automata (Harrison et al., 2007). In management research, ABM can also be framed 
using tools such as longitudinal social network analysis and game theory (Fioretti & 
Lomi, 2011). 
Simulation allows management theorists to make realistic assumptions that may 
in turn lead researchers to generate hypotheses that are integrated and consistent 
(Harrison et al., 2007).  Simulation based approaches (such as agent-based simulation) 
can contribute to organization research in following ways (Axelrod, 1997; Harrison et al., 
2007): 
Prediction: Analysis of simulation output may reveal relationships among 
variables that can be viewed as prediction of the simulation model.  
Proofs: Some kinds of existential simulation can show that it is possible for the 
modeled processes to produce certain kinds of behavior.  
Discovery: Simulations can be used to discover unexpected patterns due to 
interaction among agents.  
Explanation: If simulation outcomes are close to observed behaviors, then 
postulated processes can be possible explanations for the behaviors.  
 28 
 
Critique: Simulation can be used to examine the theoretical explanation for the 
observed phenomena, and also to explore alternative explanation for the observed 
phenomena.  
Prescription: A simulation model can provide a better way of organizing or 
performing a certain task. 
Empirical Guidance: Development of theories and models using simulation may 
guide us towards the possibility of uncovering systematic connections among previously 
unconnected variables. 
Simulation in organizational research. Organizational decision making is a 
combination and alignment of individual visions and desires through cognitive and 
political processes (Fioretti & Lomi, 2011). For analyzing processes that lead individual 
agent’s goals and decisions to a macro level organization behavior, ABM is a promising 
approach. 
An ABM views group members as agents who receive and categorize 
information, carry out a few actions that are relevant to their specialization, and pass on 
tasks to other team members. This kind of modeling approach is able to distinguish 
between the mental model of a single agent and those who act in presence of other team 
members. For the problems studied by ABM, analysis of decision process is considered 
more important than final outcomes and equilibriums of the model. 
The organization learning curve can also be modeled using an ABM where agents 
represent workers exploring different possibilities of production, until stable routine 
emerges for cumulative production. In this model, the overall behavior – i.e., the shape of 
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learning curve depends on individual interactions and also on the speed at which 
equilibrium production time is achieved.  
One of the earliest examples of simulation in organizational research is by Cohen, 
March, and Olsen (1972). Here organized anarchies of organizations such as problematic 
preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation are modeled through computer 
simulations. Modeling cultural heterogeneity as an emergent organizational property, 
Harrison and Carroll (1991) present agents as members of an organization who influence 
each other’s enculturation and turnover behavior through social influence. March (1991) 
has studied the problem of allocation of resources between the exploration of new 
possibilities and exploitation of old certainties. March (1991) drew ideas on complexity 
theory from biological sciences to examine the trade-offs. In their model, the key 
elements are: external-reality, individual beliefs, belief update and organizational code. 
Organization learning process depends on the interaction between groups, the complexity 
of task environment and the balance of exploration/exploitation within and between 
groups. Their simulation study has been able to explain the widespread use of 
exploitation, arguing that if task environment is complex then exploitation cumulating in 
the knowledge pools of different groups may provide sufficiently good results. 
Simulation is increasingly becoming a significant methodological approach for 
theory development in strategy and organization (Davis et al., 2007), where theory is 
defined as consisting of constructs linked together by propositions that have an 
underlying, coherent logic and related assumptions. Simulation enables the exploration, 
elaboration and extension of simple theories into logically precise and comprehensive 
theory (Davis et al., 2007). 
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Building on the approach of (March, 1991), Fang, Lee, and Schilling (2010) have 
explored how the degree of subgroup isolation and intergroup connectivity influences 
organizational learning. The interaction pattern among the members of an organization is 
modeled through a “connected cavemen” model.  
There has been consistent increase in use of ABMs to study innovation networks, 
especially in biotech firms in order to undertake joint research on specific products. 
Innovation networks evolve out of decisions made by its component firms (Gilbert et al., 
2001). 
Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) have used agent-based simulation to examine how 
and why elements of organizational design depend on one another. They identify sets of 
design elements that encourage broad search and others that promote stability. Rudolph 
and Repenning (2002) use previous case study as the basis of simple theory describing 
how minor events could lead to catastrophes. Simulation has been very effective to study 
other basic organization processes such as competition and legitimation (Lomi & Larsen, 
1996), and imitation and experimentation (Zott, 2003). 
Coen and Mritan (2011) examine the dynamic capability of resource allocation to 
invest in operational capabilities. Using ABM, they model a process of firms competing 
in factor markets for opportunities to invest in existing capabilities and acquire new ones. 
The authors conclude that, endowment and search ability both matter, and that in many 
circumstances, the effects of possessing a superior endowment dominate the effects of 
superior search ability. Cardinal et al. (2011) examine how new product development 
performance is affected by product design and the technological environment. Agent-
based simulation based on information processing theory has been used to specify and 
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refine an initial set of theoretical propositions. The authors find the existence of 
performance trade-offs in product development as well as the importance of performance 
priorities in influencing project design.  
Recently agent-based simulation has been used by Baumann and Stieglitz (2013) 
to show how firms can improve performance by offering low-powered rewards for the 
selection and implementation of employee ideas. In purely low-powered ideas, an 
employee receives no incentives if his ideas are implemented, whereas, in purely high-
powered ideas, an employee will accrue all benefits if his ideas are implemented. 
To get better understanding of agent based approaches in management research, 
few simulation approaches are discussed that formulate the basis of ABM, with notable 
research examples related with them in the management literature. 
NK fitness landscapes. This approach focuses on how rapidly and effectively 
modular systems reach to an optimal point, especially when interactions among system 
components (“agents”) are important (Davis et al., 2007). The system is conceptualized 
as a set of N nodes and K interactions among the nodes. The system is assumed to use 
adaptation or search to find the optimal point. For example, Rivkin (2000) has addressed 
the issue of replication and imitation from NK fitness landscape perspective. N is defined 
as the elements of strategy and K as the degree of interaction among the elements. Rivkin 
(2001) used agent-based simulation based on NK models to investigate the structural 
reasons for the ease of replication and the difficulty of imitation for moderately complex 
strategies. The decision problem is modeled such that the number of decisions which 
together constitute a strategy, and the degree to which those decisions interact with one 
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another, determine firm performance. Simulation findings reveal the value of superior but 
imperfect information on good solutions to hard problems.  
Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) have examined how experience and cognition 
affected the time needed to find an optimal policy for an organization. In their context, 
organizational policy is represented by N and K interactions among them. A fitness 
landscape is created by assigning performance values to every combination of values. 
When there is little interaction, there are few optimal combinations and as interaction 
increases, more combinations become locally optimal. The fitness landscape is “rugged” 
and it is hard to traverse to find the optimal point. 
Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) have used ABM to study the value of three 
different organization structures: a centralized organization, a decentralized organization 
and a temporarily decentralized organization to maintain exploration and exploitation 
strategies for firm performance. Firms with different organizational structures are 
“released” on performance landscape, over a number of periods, firm search over this 
landscape for high performing activity configuration. Here, performance landscape is 
defined as a mapping of all possible sets of a firm’s choices onto performance values. By 
comparing the performance of firms with different organizational structures over a large 
number of landscapes, performances of different organizational structures were 
examined. 
Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin (2005) have used ABM to examine how firms 
discover effective competitive positions in worlds that are both novel and complex. They 
argue that analogical reasoning may be helpful, allowing managers to transfer useful 
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wisdom from similar settings they have experienced in the past. To generate family of 
landscapes, the authors have used an adaptation of NK model. 
Lazer and Friedman (2007) examine how the structure of communication 
networks can affect the system level performance. Using ABM, the authors have 
presented a model of information sharing in which the less successful emulate the more 
successful. Simulation results suggest that when agents are dealing with a complex 
problem, the more efficient the network at disseminating information, the better the short-
run, but lower the long-run performance of the system. NK problem space specification 
has been used to model numerical problem spaces. 
Levinthal and Posen (2007) develop and test a model on the effectiveness of 
selection processes in eliminating less fit organizations from a population when 
organizations are undergoing adaptive changes.  
To gain insights into the effects of differential reliability on the efficacy of 
selection, ABM using NK methodology has been implemented. The authors conclude 
that selection may be systematically prone to errors and that selection errors are 
endogenous to, and differ markedly across firms’ search strategies. 
A coupled search process in an organization is described as managers’ activity to 
search for high-level choices that shape the search for low-level, operational choices, 
which in turn determine performance. Using ABM, Siggelkow and Rivkin (2009) show 
that coupled search processes obscure the performance impact of high-level choices 
through two mechanisms namely: survivor effect and a wanderer effect. A performance 
landscape based on NK model has been used to implement the simulation model. 
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To study inter-organizational alliance relationship, Aggarwal et al. (2011) use an 
agent-based simulation of inter-firm decision making. Simulation results point to 
complex interplay between interdependencies, governance structure, and firms’ search 
capabilities. A firm’s decision making process has been modeled using NK model. The 
performance landscape in modeled in ‘N+1’ dimensions, where N horizontal dimensions 
represent the space of all possible alternatives for each of the N policy choices, and one 
vertical dimension representing the performance level resulting from each overall choice 
configuration. Two major components of NK model implemented are: (i) mapping of 
choices to performance and (ii) generating and assessing alternative choice configuration. 
Using ABM based on the idea of performance landscape, Siggelkow & Rivkin 
(2006) show that in multilevel organizations, increased exploration at lower levels can 
backfire, reducing overall exploration and diminishing performance in environments that 
require broad search.  
NKC model, which is an extension of NK model, was developed to model co-
evolution of species. It has been adapted in strategy research (Ganco & Agarwal, 2009). 
In NKC model, there are N elements of a decision vector of each firm. The parameter K 
measures the degree of interdependence or intra-firm coupling among the N elements of 
the decision vector. The parameter C specifies the extent to which individual firms’ 
“sublandscapes” are tied together – i.e., inter-firm coupling. 
NKC framework has been used by Ganco et al. (2009) to model an industry with 
differentiated products, where each firm occupies a certain exogenous niche. The model 
also incorporates inter-firm interaction i.e., each firm’s choices have an impact on the 
payoffs of the choices of the other firms. Using NKC model, the authors have 
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investigated how entrant characteristics interact with environmental characteristics to 
explain differences in firm performance. 
In another example, Siggelkow and Rivkin (2005) have used ABM to examine the 
effects of environmental turbulence, and complexity on formal design of organizations. 
The authors account for differences between simulation results and conventional wisdom 
due to powers of department heads to withhold information about departmental options, 
to control decision-making agendas, to veto firm-wide alternatives, and to take unilateral 
actions.  
Porter et al. (2008) provide an introduction to complementarity framework and 
the NK-model for agent-based simulation studies, in the context of interactions among 
activities, and the consequences of these interactions on the creation and sustainability of 
competitive advantage. Noting that neither NK-model simulation approach nor the 
complementarity frameworks are suitable to study contextual interactions (i.e., 
interactions that are influenced by other activity choices made by a firm), future research 
directions for contextual interactions have been provided. 
Genetic algorithms. Genetic algorithms focus on how rapidly and effectively a 
population of heterogeneous agents, represented as genes, adaptively learns. Adaptation 
occurs through a stochastic evolutionary process that includes: mutation, selection, 
crossover, and reproduction from one generation to next that eventually leads to gradual 
improvement. Eventually, only high-performing agents remain in the population. Thus 
can be used to examine the evolution of specific types of strategies within an agent.  
In an example related to organizational research, Bruderer and Singh (1996) used 
genetic algorithm to examine organizational evolution within a population of 
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organizations. They found that learning accelerated the discovery of an effective 
organizational form. 
Cellular automata. Cellular automata assume a system of agents that are spatially 
related. Spatial relatedness implies that the degree to which agents influence each other is 
dependent upon distance between them (Harrison et al., 2007). Agents behave according 
to some simple rules. Usually the rules that relate to spatial processes are uniform and 
deterministic. Some rules govern how neighbors affect an agent’s behavior.  
Lomi and Larsen (1996) used cellular automata to examine the tension between 
competition and legitimation process. It was observed how competitive and legitimating 
behavior among agents affected population density, founding rates and failure rates 
(macro level patterns). 
The use of agent-based simulation based on cellular automata to study the 
participation of firms in online communities as a means to enhance demand for their 
products, has been discussed by Miller, Fabian, and Lin (2009). Using a simulation 
model, the authors demonstrate, how demand evolves as a function of interpersonal 
communication a firm’s chosen strategy. They have also identified key variables 
affecting the diffusion of product preferences and assess the effectiveness under different 
conditions. 
Reinforcement learning. Fang and Levinthal (2009) have studied the merits and 
disadvantages of exploitive behavior in the context of multi-stage decision making. To 
examine the trade-off between exploration and exploitation in multi-stage settings, a 
mechanism based on Q learning has been developed. Q learning explicitly models the 
evolution of an actors’ existing representation of task environment by updating rules 
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through dynamic programming and reinforcing successful strategies over the 
unsuccessful ones. Fang et al. (2009) find that in a multistage problem; exploitation can 
lead to decline in both long-run and immediate decline in payoffs. Further, a decision 
policy that is mildly exploitive is superior to an explicit maximization of perceived 
payoffs.  
Fang (2012) outline a theoretical model of organizational learning to account for 
empirical regularities based on credit assignment, where sequentially interdependent 
activities are termed as credit assignment problem. Using simulation and human subjects 
to validate credit assignment problem, Fang (2012) has provided a baseline model for the 
future development of an ABM consisting of heterogeneous agents that could have better 
fit with data. 
Organizational simulation as research methodology. Harrison et al. (2007) and 
Davis et al. (2007) provide suggestions for developing simulation models for 
organization research. This section is based on these suggestions. Constructing simulation 
models involve identifying the underlying processes that govern the behavior of an agent 
(or actor) and formalizing them as a set of mathematical equations or computational 
rules. Transformation rules also need to be specified for determining the evolution of 
system over time. The resulting model embodies theoretical development and ideas. 
Hypotheses are normally not offered in simulation research; instead a model’s 
consequences are determined computationally, which then lead to development of 
hypotheses or theoretical conclusions. Theoretical rigor introduced by formal modeling is 
considered one of the main strengths of simulation.  
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A simulation developer needs to consider the following five factors: (a) initial 
conditions, (b) time structure, (c) outcome determination, (d) number of simulation runs 
(iterations) and (e) sensitivity analysis with respect to different variables. These concepts 
for developing simulation models have been incorporated in the example of coin toss by 
Harrison and Carroll (1991). 
Consider a problem of coin toss in which we want to get the probability of getting 
a first head and then a tail in two independent coin tosses. The processes of 
computational model are coin tosses. Parameter p can be defined as the probability of 
getting head (not necessarily fair). The faces of coin can be simulated through generating 
random numbers uniformly between 0 and 1. The initial condition does not need to be 
specified, as outcome depends on generating the random number p. The time structure is 
two periods. The run can be repeated many times with different random numbers to 
determine the percentage of heads and tails. Sensitivity analysis can be performed 
through changing the values of p. 
Internal validity of computation model is established through verification. The 
verification of computational model could be done in the following ways:  
Comparing simulation results with the propositions of the simple theory. If 
simulation confirms the propositions, then the theoretical logic and its computational 
representation are likely to be correct. 
Computational findings should also be verified through robustness check 
(sensitivity analysis) and extreme value of constructs. 
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Mismatch between the propositions from simple theories and the simulation 
results can addressed by eliminating coding errors and shortcoming in the theoretical 
logic. 
External validity of theory (i.e. generalizability and predictability) could be 
established through comparing simulation results with empirical data. Validation is 
especially necessary for non-empirical arguments (formal analytic modeling) and theory 
based on other scientific disciplines (Davis et al., 2007).  
Challenges in organizational simulation research.  
Model complexity: For realistic and elaborate models it often becomes 
problematic to determine what drives the results. From the view point of theory 
development, model should be presented as a simplified abstraction of the system – that 
retains the key elements of the relevant processes without unduly complicating the model 
(Harrison et al., 2007). Another approach can be to start with a simple model, and then 
elaborate it with adding complexity stepwise. 
Model grounding: To incorporate the real-world behavior in simulation, models 
processes could be based on empirical work. Ungrounded parameters and issues often 
require thorough sensitivity analysis. When grounding is not possible, simulations can be 
used to explore consequences of theoretically derived processes. 
Problems and limitations: Apart from common pitfalls seen in other research 
methods, presentation and details are one of main issues with simulation results. In the 
absence of sufficient details, it becomes difficult to develop any level of confidence on 
the findings. Bugs in computer programs can also produce spurious results. Translation of 
formal models in computer codes also poses a threat, in which different order of 
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execution of codes may produce different results. Replicating simulation results is often 
an issue, for example, independent attempts to replicate Garbage Can Model has 
produced mixed results (Harrison et al., 2007). As a major improvement, the findings of 
agent-based garbage can model has been presented by Fioretti and Lomi (2010) – 
eliminating several flaws from the original model. Generalizing simulation results is also 
considered problematic, and generalization beyond the range of simulation parameters 
should be treated as conjecture.  
ABM offers new venues for management and organizational research and is also 
capable of generating non-linear behaviors of complex systems that are, often difficult to 
model through traditional research methodologies. Computational models can be treated 
as larger laboratories that allow management researchers to experiment possibilities 
(Burton & Obel, 2011). 
Other Business Disciplines 
In this section we discuss agent-based models in marketing and accounting 
applications. Given that there are recent surveys related to this, we keep this discussion 
relatively short, and refer readers to the relevant work. 
Marketing phenomena such as product diffusion, is often categorized as complex 
processes that involves interaction among various agents e.g., consumers, sellers, 
distributors (Rand & Rust, 2011). Use of ABM to represent complex marketing 
phenomena, difficult to model through analytical or empirical approaches, is proposed by 
Rand and Rust (2011), who also provide a detailed review in marketing.  
In the marketing literature ABM mostly appears in the study of diffusion of 
innovations and new product adoption (Rand & Rust, 2011). An excellent overview of 
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the use of ABM in innovation (or new product development) research has been provided 
by Garcia (2005). Here, the focus is on notable examples of ABM in the marketing 
research literature. 
The effects of individual and network level, and negative word of mouth on a 
firm’s profits have been explored using ABM by Goldenberg et al. (2007). The effect of 
negative word-of-mouth on the net present value (NPV) of a firm was found to be 
substantial, even when initial numbers of dissatisfied customers were relatively small. 
Weak ties of a given network help to spread harmful information through networks. 
Goldenberg et al. (2009) have examined the role of hubs in diffusion and 
adoption. The dynamics of system is modeled through ABM where each agent is a 
potential adopter of innovation. Hubs are identified as people with large number of ties 
with other people. When the numbers of adopters in a neighborhood exceeded the 
threshold, an agent adopted the product. Stephen et al. (2010) have used ABM of online 
social networks to study information dissemination in online social networks. 
Garber et al. (2004) have used Cellular Automata in presence of “small-world” 
network – a variant of ABM, as a predictive tool to assess the success of a new product 
shortly after launch time. Spatial divergence approach based on cross-entropy divergence 
measures have been used to determine the distance between simulated and real-life data 
of the adoption process. In another example, Goldenberg et al. (2002) have used Cellular 
Automata for generating and analyzing data, to investigate conditions under which a 
“saddle” occurs. Saddle in the context of sales is defined as an initial peak, then a trough 
of sufficient depth, and duration to exclude random fluctuations, and eventually the sales 
levels that exceed the initial peak.   
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When is it better to use ABM, and when should differential equations be used? 
This question has been addressed by Rahmandad and Sterman (2010) in the context of 
the diffusion of contagious disease. Examining the effects of individual heterogeneity on 
different network topologies, they conclude that differential equation and mean agent-
based dynamics differ in several metrics. 
Feng et al. (2012) use ABM to calculate aggregate diffusion dynamics for the 
adoption of new products without the mean-field approximation. Clusters-dynamics have 
been used to derive analytic approximation of the aggregate diffusion dynamics in 
multidimensional ABM. They conclude that the one-dimensional model and the Bass 
model provide a lower bound and an upper bound, respectively, for the aggregation of 
diffusion dynamics in ABM with any spatial structures.  
Chou et al. (2007) have proposed an agent-based continuous auditing model 
(ABCAM). The basic premise of ABCAM has been that the various tasks performed by 
human auditors can be performed through software agents. The system uses mobile and 
intelligent agents to help human auditors perform various accounting tasks. In their 
context, mobility refers to the agents’ (software object) ability to travel from one platform 
to another, and intelligence refers to the deployment of different degrees of artificial 
intelligence. The system is able to undertake automatic auditing in real time, and is easily 
adaptable to changes in auditing requirements. 
Davis & Pesch (2012) have developed an ABM model to examine the emergent 
characteristics of fraud in organizations. Heterogeneous agents, with different motives 
and opportunity to commit fraud and pro-fraud attitude interact with each other that lead 
to attitude formation towards fraud. The model allows an evaluation of the relative 
 43 
 
efficacy of mechanism designed to prevent fraud. The use of ABM provides insights into 
fraud even when data in organizations are censored.  
The model consists of organizations, where agent representation of these 
organizations interact repeatedly (Davis et al., 2012). A model to investigate the impact 
of mechanisms to prevent or detect fraud is compared against a benchmark model in 
which all agents have the opportunity and motive to commit a fraud and pro-fraud 
attitude. Broadly two patterns emerge from the analysis of the benchmark model, 
depending upon how susceptible individual agents are to social influence. When average 
susceptibility is low, the number of fraudsters converges toward a specific level over 
time. When average susceptibility is moderate to high, the number of fraudsters vacillates 
over time between extremes: either almost everybody is fraudster or nobody.  
Simulation Platforms 
For the correct implementation of ABM, we need to choose an appropriate 
framework for its development. The implementation of a large scale ABM largely has 
been based on Object-Oriented (OO) programming. OO programming provides a 
framework to implement agents, their behavior and the environment surrounding them 
(North & Macal, 2007).  The complete model is built of objects. The modular nature of 
OO programming provides flexibility in developing, maintaining and enhancing a 
complex model.   
UML is often considered a standardized way of OO software design. Due to the 
graphical visualization, UML presents a higher level of abstraction than that of OO 
programming (Bersini, 2012), which is then easier to produce and communicate. The 
advantage of using UML diagrams in terms of: class, sequence, state and activity 
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diagrams has been discussed by Bersini (2012). The remaining part of this section 
presents a, discussion on modeling platforms that provide either or both of the 
aforementioned techniques (OO or UML) to build ABMs.  
A comparison of various ABM tools have been presented in prior research, e.g., 
(Gatchell, 2008; Lytinen & Railsback, 2012; Nikolai & Madey, 2009). Also, a summary 
of different simulation tools can be accessed online: 
www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/acecode.htm, www.openabm.org/page/modeling-
platforms (Nikolai & Madey, 2009; Tobias & Hofmann, 2004). Some of the platforms 
mentioned in aforementioned sources do not have active support. 
In the present work, instead of producing the comprehensive list of ABM 
platforms, major current development environments with active developer support have 
been listed (Table-2.1) and their salient features are discussed. Repast
4
 is considered the 
most popular java based programming library for developing models (Nikolai et al., 
2009; Tobias et al., 2004). Repast is developed by Social Science Research Computing, 
University of Chicago for social scientific use. It is supported in Java and Groovy 
programming languages. Repast also provides support to use other computation packages 
such as, MATLAB, R, JUNG etc. Repast HPC provides support for high performance 
distributed computing platforms. Another development framework, MASON, has similar 
features to Repast (Tobias et al., 2004).  
NetLogo
5
 is considered well documented and easy to learn tool for ABMs 
(Lytinen & Railsback, 2012). It is a popular tool among social scientists, those are new to 
                                                          
4 http://repast.sourceforge.net 
5 http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo  
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programming. NetLogo was developed at the Center for Connected Learning (CCL) at 
Northwestern University and its development was influenced by its precursor StarLogo.  
Table 2.1: ABM Development Platforms 
Package Language Brief Summary License 
Repast Java, Groovy ABM toolkit with various built-in features Open source 
AnyLogic Java Supports system dynamics, discrete event 
and ABM. Widely used in modeling of 
manufacturing and logistics, business 
processes, human resources, consumer and 
patient behavior 
Proprietary 
NetLogo Logo dialect Multi-agent programmable modeling 
environment 
Open source 
Breve Python 3D simulation environments for multi-agent 
systems and artificial life 
Open source 
Cougaar Java Especially designed for large-scale 
distributed agent-based applications 
Open source 
TNG C++ TNG
6
 is a framework for studying the 
formation and evolution of trade networks 
among strategically interacting agents 
Open source 
Altreva Adaptive 
Modeler 
GUI interface An application for creating agent-based 
market simulation based on evolutionary 
computing for stocks, forex currencies, 
exchange traded funds (ETFs) 
Proprietary 
Cormas Smalltalk Models concerned with the management of 
renewable resources, economic exchanges of 
agricultural products, and natural resources 
and land-use dynamics 
Open source 
Gambit C++ Library of game theory software and tools 
for the construction and analysis of finite 
extensive and strategic games 
Open source 
JASA Java High-performance auction simulator using 
different auction mechanism 
Open source 
MATSim Java Java based platform to implement agent-
based transport simulation 
Open source 
                                                          
6
 http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm 
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The model execution time of NetLogo is considerably faster than ReLogo – a 
dialect of Logo, based on NetLogo. ReLogo is embedded in Eclipse development 
environment, and provides access to RePast libraries (Lytinen et al., 2012). Most of the 
platforms have specialized purposes. Their specialized support is discussed in the Table-
2.1. 
References 
Adomavicius, G., Gupta, A., & Zhdanov, D. 2009. Designing intelligent software agents 
for auctions with limited information feedback. Information Systems Research, 
20(4): 507. 
Aggarwal, V. A., Siggelkow, N., & Singh, H. 2011. Governing collaborative activity: 
interdependence and the impact of coordination and exploration. Strategic 
management journal, 32(7): 705-730. 
Avenali, A., and Bassanini, A. 2007. "Simulating combinatorial auctions with dominance 
requirement and loll bids through automated agents," Decision Support Systems 
(43:1), pp 211-228. 
Axelrod, R. M. 1997. The complexity of cooperation: Agent-based models of competition 
and collaboration: Princeton Univ Pr. 
Bapna, R., Goes, P., & Gupta, A. 2003. Replicating online Yankee auctions to analyze 
auctioneers' and bidders' strategies. Information Systems Research, 14(3): 244-
268. 
Baumann, O., & Stieglitz, N. 2013. Rewarding value‐creating ideas in organizations: The 
power of low‐powered incentives*. Strategic management journal. 
Bersini, H. 2012. UML for ABM. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 
15(1): 9. 
Bianchi, C., Cirillo, P., Gallegati, M., & Vagliasindi, P. A. 2007. Validating and 
calibrating agent-based models: a case study. Computational Economics, 30(3): 
245-264. 
Bichler, M., Shabalin, P., & Pikovsky, A. 2009. A computational analysis of linear price 
iterative combinatorial auction formats. Information Systems Research, 20(1): 33-
59. 
Birukov, A., Blanzieri, E., and Giorgini, P. Year. "Implicit: An agent-based 
recommendation system for web search," Proceedings of the fourth international 
joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, ACM2005, pp. 
618-624. 
 47 
 
Bonabeau, E. 2002. Agent-based modeling: Methods and techniques for simulating 
human systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 99(Suppl 3): 7280. 
Bonabeau, E. 2007. Understanding and managing complexity risk. MIT Sloan 
management review, 48(4): 62-68. 
Bruderer, E., & Singh, J. V. 1996. Organizational evolution, learning, and selection: A 
genetic-algorithm-based model. Academy of Management Journal: 1322-1349. 
Burton, R. M., & Obel, B. 2011. Computational modeling for what-is, what-might-be, 
and what-should-be studies—And triangulation. Organization Science, 22(5): 
1195-1202. 
Caldarelli, G., Marsili, M., & Zhang, Y.-C. 1997. A prototype model of stock exchange. 
EPL (Europhysics Letters), 40(5): 479. 
Cardinal, B. L., Turner, S. F., Fern, M. J., and Burton, M. R. 2011. "Organizing for 
Product Development Across Technological Environments: Performance Trade-
offs and Priorities," Organization Science (22:4).  
Chakrabarti, A. S., & Chakrabarti, B. K. 2009. Microeconomics of the ideal gas like 
market models. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 388(19): 
4151-4158. 
Chakraborti, A., Toke, I. M., Patriarca, M., & Abergel, F. 2011. Econophysics review: II. 
Agent-based models. Quantitative Finance, 11(7): 1013-1041. 
Challet, D., & Stinchcombe, R. 2001. Analyzing and modeling 1+ 1< i> d</i> markets. 
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 300(1): 285-299. 
Challet, D., & Zhang, Y.-C. 1997. Emergence of cooperation and organization in an 
evolutionary game. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 246(3): 
407-418. 
Challet, D., & Zhang, Y.-C. 1998. On the minority game: Analytical and numerical 
studies. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 256(3): 514-532. 
Chang, R. M., Oh, W., Pinsonneault, A., & Kwon, D. 2010. A Network Perspective of 
Digital Competition in Online Advertising Industries: A Simulation-Based 
Approach. Information Systems Research, 21(3): 571-593. 
Chari, K. 2000. Intelligent Agents: Overview, Applications and Research Directions. 
INFORMS Computing Society Newsletter 21(2). 
Chari, K., and Agrawal, M. 2007. "Multi-issue automated negotiations using agents," 
INFORMS Journal on Computing (19:4), pp 588-595. 
 48 
 
Chatterjee, A., K Chakrabarti, B., & Manna, S. 2004. Pareto law in a kinetic model of 
market with random saving propensity. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its 
Applications, 335(1): 155-163. 
Chen, S.-H. 2012. Varieties of agents in agent-based computational economics: A 
historical and an interdisciplinary perspective. Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control, 36(1): 1-25. 
Chiarella, C., & Iori, G. 2002. A simulation analysis of the microstructure of double 
auction markets. Quantitative Finance, 2(5): 346-353. 
Chou, C. L.-y., Du, T., and Lai, V. S. 2007. "Continuous auditing with a multi-agent 
system," Decision Support Systems (42:4), pp 2274-2292. 
Coen, C. A., and Maritan, C. A. 2011. "Investing in capabilities: The dynamics of 
resource allocation," Organization Science (22:1), pp 99-117. 
Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. 1972. A garbage can model of organizational 
choice. Administrative science quarterly: 1-25. 
Cont, R. 2007. Volatility clustering in financial markets: empirical facts and agent-based 
models, Long memory in economics: 289-309: Springer. 
Cont, R., & Bouchaud, J.-P. 2000. Herd behavior and aggregate fluctuations in financial 
markets. Macroeconomic dynamics, 4(2): 170-196. 
Cristelli, M., Pietronero, L., & Zaccaria, A. 2011. Critical overview of agent-based 
models for economics. arXiv preprint arXiv:1101.1847. 
Davis, J. P., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Bingham, C. B. 2007. Developing Theory Through 
Simulation Methods. Academy of Management Review, 32(2): 480-499. 
Davis, J. S., & Pesch, H. L. 2012. Fraud dynamics and controls in organizations. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society. 
Du, T. C., Li, E. Y., and Wei, E. 2005. "Mobile agents for a brokering service in the 
electronic marketplace," Decision Support Systems (39:3), pp 371-383. 
The Economist, 2010. Agents of Change. http://www.economist.com/node/16636121. 
Fagiolo, G., Moneta, A., & Windrum, P. 2007. A Critical Guide to Empirical Validation 
of Agent-Based Models in Economics: Methodologies, Procedures, and Open 
Problems. Comput. Econ., 30(3): 195-226. 
Fang, C., and Levinthal, D. 2009. "Near-term liability of exploitation: exploration and 
exploitation in multistage problems," Organization Science (20:3), pp 538-551. 
 49 
 
Fang, C., Lee, J., & Schilling, M. A. 2010. Balancing exploration and exploitation 
through structural design: The isolation of subgroups and organizational learning. 
Organization Science, 21(3): 625-642. 
Fang, C. 2012. "Organizational learning as credit assignment: A model and two 
experiments," Organization Science (23:6), pp 1717-1732.  
Farmer, J. D., & Foley, D. 2009. The economy needs agent-based modelling. Nature, 
460(7256): 685-686. 
Fasli, M., and Michalakopoulos, M. 2008. "e-Game: A platform for developing auction-
based market simulations," Decision Support Systems (44:2), pp 469-481. 
Feng, L., Li, B., Podobnik, B., Preis, T., & Stanley, H. E. 2012. Linking agent-based 
models and stochastic models of financial markets. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 109(22): 8388-8393. 
Fioretti, G., & Lomi, A. 2010. Passing the buck in the garbage can model of 
organizational choice. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 
16(2): 113-143. 
Fioretti, G., & Lomi, A. 2011. Agent-based simulation models in organization science. 
Available at SSRN 1874885. 
Gaines, D. A., & Pakath, R. 2013. An Examination of Evolved Behavior in Two 
Reinforcement Learning Systems. Decision Support Systems. 
Ganco, M., & Agarwal, R. 2009. Performance differentials between diversifying entrants 
and entrepreneurial start-ups: A complexity approach. Academy of Management 
Review, 34(2): 228-252. 
Garber, T., Goldenberg, J., Libai, B., & Muller, E. 2004. From density to destiny: Using 
spatial dimension of sales data for early prediction of new product success. 
Marketing Science, 23(3): 419-428. 
Garcia, R. 2005. Uses of Agent‐Based Modeling in Innovation/New Product 
Development Research*. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 22(5): 380-
398. 
Gatchell, A. 2008. Agent-Based Modeling. Working Paper. 
Gatti, D. D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B. C., Russo, A., and Stiglitz, J. E. 2009. 
"Business fluctuations and bankruptcy avalanches in an evolving network 
economy," Journal of economic interaction and coordination (4:2), pp 195-212. 
Gavetti, G., & Levinthal, D. 2000. Looking forward and looking backward: Cognitive 
and experiential search. Administrative science quarterly, 45(1): 113-137. 
 50 
 
Gavetti, G., Levinthal, D. A., & Rivkin, J. W. 2005. Strategy making in novel and 
complex worlds: the power of analogy. Strategic management journal, 26(8): 
691-712. 
Geanakoplos, J., Axtell, R., Farmer, D. J., Howitt, P., Conlee, B., Goldstein, J., Hendrey, 
M., Palmer, N. M., & Yang, C.-Y. 2012. Getting at Systemic Risk via an Agent-
Based Model of the Housing Market. American Economic Review, 102(3): 53-58. 
Giardina, I., and Bouchaud, J.-P. 2003. "Bubbles, crashes and intermittency in agent 
based market models," The European Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and 
Complex Systems (31:3), pp 421-437. 
Gilbert, N., Pyka, A., & Ahrweiler, P. 2001. Innovation networks-a simulation approach. 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 4(3): 1-13. 
Gilli, M., & Winker, P. 2003. A global optimization heuristic for estimating agent based 
models. Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 42(3): 299-312. 
Gode, D. K., & Sunder, S. 1993. Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence 
Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality. Journal of 
Political Economy, 101(1): 119-137. 
Goldenberg, J., Han, S., Lehmann, D., & Hong, J. 2009. The role of hubs in the adoption 
processes. Journal of Marketing, 73(2). 
Goldenberg, J., Libai, B., Moldovan, S., & Muller, E. 2007. The NPV of bad news. 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 24(3): 186-200. 
Goldenberg, J., Libai, B., & Muller, E. 2002. Riding the saddle: How cross-market 
communications can create a major slump in sales. The Journal of Marketing: 1-
16. 
Greenwald, A., Kannan, K., & Krishnan, R. 2010. On evaluating information revelation 
policies in procurement auctions: A Markov decision process approach. 
Information Systems Research, 21(1): 15-36. 
Gregg, D. G., and Walczak, S. 2006. "Auction Advisor: an agent-based online-auction 
decision support system," Decision Support Systems (41:2), pp 449-471. 
Guo, W., Jank, W., & Rand, W. 2011. Estimating functional agent-based models: an 
application to bid shading in online markets format. GECCO 2011, Dublin, 
Ireland, July 12-16, 2011. 
Haber, G. 2002. Monetary and fiscal policy analysis with an agent-based macroeconomic 
model. Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie 
und Statistik), 228(2+ 3): 276-295. 
 51 
 
Harrison, J. R., & Carroll, G. R. 1991. Keeping the faith: A model of cultural 
transmission in formal organizations. Administrative science quarterly: 552-582. 
Harrison, J. R., Carroll, G. R., & Carley, K. M. 2007. Simulation modeling in 
organizational and management research. Academy of Management Review, 
32(4): 1229-1245. 
Iori, G., & Porter, J. 2012. Agent-Based Modelling for Financial Markets. 
Jones, J. L., Easley, R. F., and Koehler, G. J. 2006. "Market segmentation within 
consolidated e-markets: A generalized combinatorial auction approach," Journal 
of Management Information Systems (23:1), pp 161-182. 
Kim, G.-r., and Markowitz, H. M. 1989. "Investment rules, margin, and market 
volatility," The Journal of Portfolio Management (16:1), pp 45-52. 
Kim, H. S., & Cho, J. H. 2010. Supply chain formation using agent negotiation. Decision 
Support Systems, 49(1): 77-90. 
Kim, W.-S. 2009. "Effects of a trust mechanism on complex adaptive supply networks: 
An agent-based social simulation study," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation (12:3), p 4. 
Ladley, D. 2012. Zero intelligence in economics and finance. Knowledge Engineering 
Review, 27(2): 273. 
Lau, R. Y., Li, Y., Song, D., and Kwok, R. C. W. 2008. "Knowledge discovery for 
adaptive negotiation agents in e-marketplaces," Decision Support Systems (45:2), 
pp 310-323. 
Lazer, D., & Friedman, A. 2007. The network structure of exploration and exploitation. 
Administrative science quarterly, 52(4): 667-694. 
LeBaron, B. 2006. Agent-based computational finance. Handbook of computational 
economics, 2: 1187-1233. 
LeBaron, B., & Yamamoto, R. 2007. Long-memory in an order-driven market. Physica 
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 383(1): 85-89. 
Levinthal, D., & Posen, H. E. 2007. Myopia of selection: Does organizational adaptation 
limit the efficacy of population selection? Administrative science quarterly, 52(4): 
586-620. 
Liang, W.-Y., & Huang, C.-C. 2006. Agent-based demand forecast in multi-echelon 
supply chain. Decision Support Systems, 42(1): 390-407. 
LiCalzi, M., & Pellizzari, P. 2003. Fundamentalists clashing over the book: a study of 
order-driven stock markets. Quantitative Finance, 3(6): 470-480. 
 52 
 
Lin, R., Gal, Y. a. K., Kraus, S., and Mazliah, Y. 2013. "Training with Automated Agents 
Improves People’s Behavior in Negotiation and Coordination Tasks," Decision 
Support Systems). 
Lo, A. 2004. The adaptive markets hypothesis: Market efficiency from an evolutionary 
perspective. Journal of Portfolio Management, 30, 15-29.  
Lomi, A., & Larsen, E. R. 1996. Interacting locally and evolving globally: A 
computational approach to the dynamics of organizational populations. Academy 
of Management Journal: 1287-1321. 
Lovric, M., Li, T., & Vervest, P. 2012. Sustainable revenue management: A smart card 
enabled agent-based modeling approach. Decision Support Systems, 2012: 1-15. 
Lux, T. 2012. Estimation of an agent-based model of investor sentiment formation in 
financial markets. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 
Lux, T., & Marchesi, M. 1999. Scaling and criticality in a stochastic multi-agent model of 
a financial market. Nature, 397(6719): 498-500. 
Lytinen, S. L., & Railsback, S. F. 2012. The Evolution of Agent-based Simulation 
Platforms: A Review of NetLogo 5.0 and ReLogo. Paper presented at the 
Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Agent-Based Modeling 
and Simulation. 
Mannaro, K., Marchesi, M., & Setzu, A. 2008. Using an artificial financial market for 
assessing the impact of Tobin-like transaction taxes. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 67(2): 445-462. 
March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 2(1): 71-87. 
Mehta, K., & Bhattacharyya, S. 2006. Design, development and validation of an agent-
based model of electronic auctions. Information Technology and Management, 
7(3): 191-212. 
Mike, S., & Farmer, J. D. 2008. An empirical behavioral model of liquidity and volatility. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(1): 200-234. 
Miller, K. D., Fabian, F., & Lin, S. J. 2009. Strategies for online communities. Strategic 
management journal, 30(3): 305-322. 
Nan, N. 2011. Capturing bottom-up information technology use processes: a complex 
adaptive systems model. MIS Quarterly, 35(2): 505-532. 
Nikolai, C., & Madey, G. 2009. Tools of the trade: A survey of various agent based 
modeling platforms. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 12(2): 
2. 
 53 
 
North, M. J., & Macal, C. M. 2007. Managing business complexity: discovering strategic 
solutions with agent-based modeling and simulation: Oxford university press, 
USA. 
Nunamaker, J. F., DErrICk, D. C., Elkins, A. C., Burgoon, J. K., and Patton, M. W. 2011. 
"Embodied Conversational Agent-Based Kiosk for Automated Interviewing," 
Journal of Management Information Systems (28:1), pp 17-48. 
Oh, W., & Jeon, S. 2007. Membership herding and network stability in the open source 
community: The Ising perspective. Management Science, 53(7): 1086-1101. 
Poledna, S. 2011. Agent-based models in econophysics. uniwien. 
Porter, M., and Siggelkow, N. 2008. "Contextuality within activity systems and 
sustainability of competitive advantage," The Academy of Management 
Perspectives (22:2), pp 34-56. 
Raghu, T., Jayaraman, B., & Rao, H. 2004. Toward an integration of agent-and activity-
centric approaches in organizational process modeling: Incorporating incentive 
mechanisms. Information Systems Research, 15(4): 316-335. 
Rahmandad, H., & Sterman, J. 2010. Heterogeneity and network structure in the 
dynamics of diffusion: Comparing agent-based and differential equation models. 
Management Science, 54(5): 998. 
Rand, W., & Rust, R. T. 2011. Agent-based modeling in marketing: Guidelines for rigor. 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 28(3): 181-193. 
Rao, H. R., Chaudhury, A., & Chakka, M. 1995. Modeling Team Processes: Issues and a 
Specific Example. Information Systems Research, 6(3): 255-285. 
Ren, F., and Zhang, M. 2013. "A Singe Issue Negotiation Model for Agents Bargaining 
in Dynamic Electronic Markets," Decision Support Systems (To appear). 
Rivkin, J. W. 2000. Imitation of complex strategies. Management Science, 46(6): 824-
844. 
Rivkin, J. W. 2001. Reproducing Knowledge: Replication Without Imitation at Moderate 
Complexity. Organization Science, 12(3): 274-293. 
Rivkin, J. W., & Siggelkow, N. 2003. Balancing search and stability: Interdependencies 
among elements of organizational design. Management Science, 49(3): 290-311. 
Rudolph, J. W., & Repenning, N. P. 2002. Disaster dynamics: Understanding the role of 
quantity in organizational collapse. Administrative science quarterly: 1-30. 
 54 
 
Siggelkow, N., & Levinthal, D. A. 2003. Temporarily divide to conquer: Centralized, 
decentralized, and reintegrated organizational approaches to exploration and 
adaptation. Organization Science, 14(6): 650-669. 
Siggelkow, N., & Rivkin, J. W. 2005. Speed and search: Designing organizations for 
turbulence and complexity. Organization Science, 16(2): 101-122. 
Siggelkow, N., & Rivkin, J. W. 2006. When exploration backfires: Unintended 
consequences of multilevel organizational search. Academy of Management 
Journal, 49(4): 779-795. 
Siggelkow, N., & Rivkin, J. W. 2009. Hiding the evidence of valid theories: How 
coupled search processes obscure performance differences among organizations. 
Administrative science quarterly, 54(4): 602-634. 
Stephen, A., Dover, Y., & Goldenberg, J. 2010. A comparison of the effects of 
transmitter activity and connectivity on the diffusion of information over online 
social networks. 
Strader, T. J., Lin, F.-R., and Shaw, M. J. 1998. "Simulation of order fulfillment in 
divergent assembly supply chains," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation (1:2), pp 36-37. 
Sueyoshi, T., and Tadiparthi, G. R. 2008. "An agent-based decision support system for 
wholesale electricity market," Decision Support Systems (44:2), pp 425-446. 
Sysi-Aho, M., Chakraborti, A., & Kaski, K. 2004. Searching for good strategies in 
adaptive minority games. Physical Review E, 69(3): 036125. 
Tedeschi, G., Iori, G., & Gallegati, M. 2012. Herding effects in order driven markets: The 
rise and fall of gurus. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81(1): 82-
96. 
Tesfatsion, L., & Judd, K. L. 2006. Handbook of computational economics, Volume 2: 
Agent-based computational economics: North-Holland. 
Thurner, S., Farmer, J. D., & Geanakoplos, J. 2012. Leverage causes fat tails and 
clustered volatility. Quantitative Finance, 12(5): 695-707. 
Tobias, R., & Hofmann, C. 2004. Evaluation of free Java-libraries for social-scientific 
agent based simulation. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 7(1). 
Van Der Zee, D.-J., Holkenborg, B., & Robinson, S. 2012. Conceptual modeling for 
simulation-based serious gaming. Decision Support Systems. 
Valluri, A., and Croson, D. C. 2005. "Agent learning in supplier selection models," 
Decision Support Systems (39:2), pp 219-240. 
 55 
 
Van Der Zee, D.-J., Holkenborg, B., and Robinson, S. 2012. "Conceptual modeling for 
simulation-based serious gaming," Decision Support Systems). 
Vriend, N. J. 2000. An illustration of the essential difference between individual and 
social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 24(1): 1-19. 
Wainer, J., Ferreira, P. R., and Constantino, E. R. 2007. "Scheduling meetings through 
multi-agent negotiations," Decision Support Systems (44:1), pp 285-297. 
Wang, J., Gwebu, K., Shanker, M., and Troutt, M. D. 2009. "An application of agent-
based simulation to knowledge sharing," Decision Support Systems (46:2), pp 
532-541. 
Wang, T.-W., and Tadisina, S. K. 2007. "Simulating Internet-based collaboration: A cost-
benefit case study using a multi-agent model," Decision Support Systems (43:2), 
pp 645-662. 
Yang, C. C., Yen, J., and Chen, H. 2000. "Intelligent internet searching agent based on 
hybrid simulated annealing," Decision Support Systems (28:3), pp 269-277. 
Zaffar, M. A., Kumar, R. L., & Zhao, K. 2011. Diffusion dynamics of open source 
software: An agent-based computational economics (ACE) approach. Decision 
Support Systems, 51(3): 597-608. 
Zott, C. 2003. Dynamic capabilities and the emergence of intraindustry differential firm 
performance: insights from a simulation study. Strategic management journal, 
24(2): 97-125. 
  
 56 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 : Count Amplification and Manipulation  
Resistance in Top-N News Recommender 
Introduction 
Historically, mass media has played an important role in creating and sustaining 
mass opinion and behavior in society on issues ranging from policy, violence, new 
product adoption, family and health related issues (Myers 2000, Rogers 1976). 
Traditionally, editorial perspectives have driven the decisions of what news to present to 
readers, and media editors have therefore been in positions to form and shape opinion. 
However, that trend is changing with technology-driven decisions that are being used 
instead, or in conjunction.  
In the last ten years, the Web has grown to become the primary news source for 
many users. At the same time there has been bigger penetration of social media such as 
tweets, Facebook posts and online videos (Economist-b 2011). The Economist has noted 
that this change in news consumption behavior has “turned the news industry upside 
down, making it more participatory, social, diverse and partisan” (Economist-b 2011). 
Readers often volunteer to submit, share and comment on news articles. Referrals from 
social networks are the fastest growing source of traffic for some news websites and, as 
The Economist writes, “the most popular stories cause a flood of traffic as 
recommendations ripple across social networks” (Economist-b 2011). Hence, once an 
article makes it into a “most popular” list, there can be a self-reinforcing effect that can 
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further impact its ultimate readership or influence. Figure 3.1 presents some variants of 
most popular list displayed by popular media sites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The focus of this research is to investigate the phenomena emerging through 
reader interaction with News Recommendation Systems (NRS hereafter), and to address 
the issue of manipulation in NRS. While there is little work that has addressed the issue 
of recommender manipulation for news, this topic is important because significant public 
opinion in the society is known to be influenced by user exposure to news. For example, 
Phillips (1974) studied the effect of publicity given to suicide stories and found that there 
was an immediate increase in suicide cases after such news was publicized. 
To distort opinion, recommender systems are an easy target for manipulators. For 
example, Lerman (2007-a) describes a Digg controversy in which a user posted an 
analysis proving that the top 30 users of Digg were responsible for a disproportionate 
fraction of the front page. The allegation was that the top users conspired to promote their 
own articles at the expense of other articles, leading to such an increased concentration. 
In response, Digg modified the algorithm to devalue votes from friends. Also, there are 
Figure 3.1. Variants of “most-popular” recommender 
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special group of online users known to be in existence, such as the “Internet Water Army” 
(Chen, et al. 2011) who get paid for posting comments, threads and news articles. These 
groups are known to “flood” the internet with purposeful comments and articles. Chen, et 
al. (2011) discuss techniques to identify such manipulators from behavioral and semantic 
data. The implication is that by identifying and removing such users, manipulation might 
decrease.  
The susceptibility of most popular lists towards manipulation has been 
demonstrated by Weber ( December 19, 2010) – Managing Editor of NewsWeek. To 
demonstrate that these systems can be easily gamed, he used a group of people to place a 
relatively old science story in the most emailed list.  
These examples highlight the context of our research agenda. Further, NRS in 
comparison to other recommender systems, operate in a fundamentally different 
environment due to a constant stream of news. Such an environment places a greater need 
for effective recommender systems, yet suffers from potentially easier manipulation due 
to several factors such as the greater use of implicit feedback mechanisms where clicks 
are counted as votes, sparseness in various topic categories and incentive mechanisms 
currently in place that encourage greater clicks for higher advertising revenue. 
In this research, we study two very different selection mechanisms and discuss the 
trade-off between them. One of selection mechanisms, called “most popular” (or Top-N) 
list is widely used in current practice. We note that the term Top-N is also used in the 
context of personalized recommender systems (Deshpande and Karypis 2004). But, in the 
present research, we use it to refer to the “most popular” news recommender and its 
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variants such as most e-mailed or most viewed. The other selection mechanism, 
probabilistic selection, has been introduced in this research. 
Our findings have been presented in two ways. First using simulation, we show 
that the most popular recommender is prone to artificially amplifying small differences. 
The (   )   article, which may have “just” missed the cutoff, is often unduly 
penalized in terms of readership counts in the long run. The probabilistic variant is shown 
instead to be robust. This weakness of the most popular recommender can be exploited 
by manipulators who seek to gain popularity for their articles. In this context we also 
show that the probabilistic mechanism is again more robust. Building on statistical results 
on classical urn models, namely Pólya’s and Bernard Friedman’s urn models, (Freedman 
1965) we derive some theoretical insights for special cases. The trade-off between the 
Top-N NRS and the proposed probabilistic variant is discussed in terms of count 
distortion and information quality
7
. Whereas we do observe some loss of information 
quality in probabilistic NRS, it is highly robust towards minimizing artificial 
amplification in the counts of the recommended articles in comparison with the Top-N 
NRS. We present results on manipulation for the probabilistic NRS in comparison with 
an “adapted” influence limiter heuristic (Resnick and Sami 2007). We have also 
discussed our key findings in a more realistic setting, with data collected from five 
different local news websites. Finally, an extension of probabilistic selection has been 
introduced and we demonstrate that this extended model can be used to address an 
interesting issue of social desirability between the Top-N and probabilistic selection 
mechanisms. To our knowledge these are all unique contributions of this research. 
                                                          
7
 Counts of articles has been assumed as the surrogate measure of quality 
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Related Work 
In one of the earliest research in online manipulation, Dellarocas (2006) presented 
theoretical analysis of manipulation strategies and its impact on the firm and consumer 
assuming that the main source of quality information for consumers is an online product 
review forum. This work has established various results on effects of online forum 
manipulation in a simple monopoly setting. The analysis of results shows the existence of 
a setting where forum manipulation is equivalent to a form of quality signaling that 
benefits consumers. Also, if consumers expect that firms will manipulate, as the volume 
and quality of user-generated online content increases, then there will be a certain 
threshold beyond which firms will have to engage in profit-reducing online manipulation 
practices. The findings from closed-form solutions have been also generalized in a wide 
range of multi-firm settings and for a broad class of consumer utilities, firm payoff 
functions and signal distributions. Finally, the author has proposed an idea of filtering 
technologies that make it costlier for firms to manipulate. We take a similar approach to 
study NRS through simulation and develop analytical results. 
Manipulation resistant recommender systems discussed in the literature is also 
related to our work (Resnick and Sami 2007, Resnick and Sami 2008). Resnick and Sami 
(2007) introduced the                   algorithm for items recommendation, 
controlling rater’s influence on recommender systems through reputation acquired over 
time. The authors show that the optimal strategy of a rater is to induce predictions that 
accurately reveal the rater’s information about the item. Using an information-theoretic 
measure, the authors establish that the negative impact of any rater is bounded by a given 
limit. In their subsequent work Resnick and Sami (2008) establish the tradeoffs between 
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resistance to manipulation by an attacker and the optimal use of genuine ratings in 
recommender systems. A lower bound on how much information must be discarded is 
also provided. Lee and Zhu (2012) have studied                  detection on 
recommender systems and have proposed a two phase procedure. First, a 
multidimensional scaling has been used to identify distinct behavior and to narrow down 
the detection space by filtering out noise profiles. In the second phase, a clustering based 
method has been used to discriminate the attackers. 
Van Roy and Yan (2010) have studied linear collaborative filtering (CF) 
algorithms and have shown it to be robust in comparison to nearest neighbor algorithms 
widely used in commercial systems. This analysis of linear CF algorithms shows that as a 
user rates an increasing number of products, the average accuracy becomes insensitive to 
manipulated data. The authors have established bounds on distortion as a function of 
percentage of manipulated data and number of products rated by a user whose future 
rating will be predicted.  
In particular for NRS, Largillier, et al. (2010) have discussed a robust voting 
system for social news websites based on SpotRank. Considering voting as a 
recommendation, Lergillier et al. present a set of heuristics that demotes the effects of 
manipulation. SpotRank is built over        statistical filters, a collusion detection 
mechanism and also the reputation of users and proposed news. In their work, they 
discuss several issues of social NRS, such as the existence of cabals (collusion of large 
group of users that vote for each other), those who try to manipulate the system using 
daily mailing lists, some users posting many links to flood the system, and using several 
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IP addresses to vote for themselves. Lerman (2007-b) has discussed a model for the news 
aggregation process by Digg for news recommendation and ratings.  
In the context of social influence Salganik, et al. (2006) found that the presence of 
social influence leads to greater inequality and unpredictability in the popularity of songs. 
In a broader context, the issue of popularity has been addressed by Easley and Kleinberg 
(2010), in which they have argued that the power law seems to dominate in cases where 
quantity being measured can be viewed as any kind of popularity. 
Model 
We present the main findings of our study using the approach of a thought 
experiment implemented as a simulation. This has been a powerful tool to address 
various issues related with social sciences and public policy (Maroulis, et al. 2010, 
Schelling 1971). For instance, using a thought experiment, Schelling (1971), showed that 
a small preference for one's neighbors to be of the same color could lead to total 
segregation of society, and using a similar methodology Maroulis, et al. (2010) studied 
the survival of public schools based on individual choices. 
Model description. We set up the simulation model as follows. We maintain a 
Comprehensive List (CL) of articles and their corresponding counts (or clicks). From 
     articles are selected for display as “recommendations”. Before the simulation starts 
articles are assigned random counts in some range (e.g. between 0 and 1000). Articles are 
sorted in decreasing order of their counts, and the articles with high counts are selected 
for the Display List (DL).  Further, the (   )    article was deliberately assigned a 
count of exactly one less than the count of     article. 
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The selection of articles in the    is updated at a pre-selected time step, and this 
selection of articles is based on two different selection processes namely, the       
and probabilistic selection. The Top-N selection is a “hard cutoff”, which selects   
articles for display corresponding to the highest counts. This is typically how most online 
news sites display the most popular or viewed articles, typically in a prominent box or 
sidebar. Probabilistic selection on the other hand, is a mechanism proposed here, where 
articles are selected probabilistically based on their counts thus far. In this mechanism, 
every article in    will have some probability, based on its count, to appear in  . 
Probabilistic selection of articles is based on probabilistic sampling without 
replacement for   articles. The probability that an article will be selected in    is given 
by     ( )   
      
∑        
, where        represents the count of an article     at a given 
time step and ∑         represents the total counts of articles not yet selected for  . 
This sampling process is repeated   times to generate the   recommendations in DL. 
Pseudo code for the implementation of these selection processes is discussed later in this 
section. 
Two different reader models were also implemented. In both models, a user is 
assumed to select an article either from    with some probability   or from the 
remaining list    (       ) with probability     . In the first model, a reader 
selects an article from    randomly. Whereas, in the second model, the top-most article 
in the    has the highest probability of being selected, and the bottom-most has the 
lowest probability, with a linear decrease in the selection probability between top-most 
and bottom-most articles.  
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For the second reader model, the probability of a particular article with rank 
    {       } in    being read (selected) is given by    
     
∑      
.  Here, we define rank 
as the order in which articles are displayed in the recommended list. For ease of 
exposition, the present model intentionally leaves out other complicated factors of news 
arrival and reader behavior based on front-page display of news websites. However, in 
the sensitivity analysis section we have presented findings based on some real world 
distribution of article counts (and reader behavior that gives rise to the power law 
distribution in popularity). 
Implementation of NRS. Pseudo code for the simulation and 
                        is presented below. (“Select” can be count-based or 
probabilistic; while “Choose” can be based on either of the two reader models described 
above).  
For each reader 
Sort the updated count and select   articles for    
If selected article is from   (i.e with probability  ) 
Choose an article from    and increase its count by 1 
Else 
Randomly choose an article from   ; (        ) and increase its count 
by 1 
End for. 
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Probabilistic selection. 
1. The count of articles are  [ ]  [ ]    [ ] 
2.      [ ]    
3. for x =  2 to     
     [ ]       [   ]   [   ] 
4. end for 
5. for y = 1 to   
a. generate a random integer ( ) between 0 and      [   ] 
b. determine the indices between which R lies, as (     ) 
c. select article corresponding to the count   [ ] for    
d. j   [ ] 
e. While (     ) 
     [ ]=      [   ]-  
f. end while 
g. n=n-1 
            end for 
 
Measures. In order to compare different user models and selection mechanisms 
we introduce two specific measures here. Both of these measures are based on the counts 
of     and (   )    articles over the complete simulation. Both     and (  
 )   articles selected here are based on the initial counts of articles before the simulation 
starts. 
Measure M1. This is defined as the logarithmic-ratio of the counts of     and 
(   )   articles at each time-step as follows: 
  ( )    (       )    (     (   ) )    
       
     (   ) 
  at the     iteration of 
the simulation. This measures the relative change in counts of     and (   )   article, 
hence count amplification between the articles. This measure has been chosen to 
demonstrate the fact that even if     article makes it into    by a hair, in the count based 
selection, in long run, it will have significantly higher popularity than the (   )   
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article simply by virtue of being in such a prominent list. We also use this measure to 
demonstrate how a manipulator can exploit the self-reinforcing nature of top-N lists. At 
the start of the simulation      ( )      (   ), hence  ( )  . 
Measure M2. This is defined as the count (hits) of the     article divided by the 
total number of count (hits) at a given time. We denote it as M2 and at the      iteration it 
will be  ( )  
       
∑        
 
   
. It represents the share of the counts for any particular article 
  in the NRS, over iterations and can be understood as a success measure of an article in a 
given selection mechanism. Other things being equal, articles with higher market shares 
can be considered more “successful” than others. 
Update rule. At each time period the model proceeds as follows. One reader 
arrives at each time step. Upon arrival reader selects probabilistically to read an article 
either from displayed list (  ) or the remaining list (  ) of articles. The probability of 
selection of an article either from    or    is controlled in the simulation. If a reader 
selects an article from   , then random selection of an article is performed. The count of 
the selected article is increased by 1. 
If a reader selects an article from    then random selection of an article is 
performed for Reader Model 1 and selection of an article is performed according to 
probability    for the Reader Model 2. The count of the selected article is increased by 1. 
For the two different NRS, count-based and probabilistic, the selection of   
articles is made for  , and    is updated at each time step. 
Manipulation. To study manipulation, we assume that a manipulator can create 
artificial clicks to raise the counts of a selected article (such as by creating fake IDs for 
instance). These fake counts are randomly distributed over the given interval. These fake 
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counts are created by malicious readers who upon arrival increase the count of a 
particular article by 1. The particular article selected for manipulation in the present 
model is the (   )  , since this is the article that would have just missed the hard 
“     ” cutoff. Also, we study two types of manipulation – early and uniform – to 
examine what impact each might have. In “early” manipulation, the fake clicks are 
assumed to be distributed in some early part of the time period; in “uniform” 
manipulation the fake clicks are uniformly distributed over the entire time interval. We 
also examine the extent of manipulation (high and low, based on how many fake counts 
are generated) and the impact it can have. 
Simulation Results 
The analyses of our results are based on two sections: (1) without manipulation 
and (2) with manipulation. The simulation results for “without manipulation” explain the 
phenomenon that emerges using different NRS based on different selection mechanisms. 
In, particular we compare the two measures M1 and M2 for     and (   )   articles 
and discuss findings based on them. Manipulation has been introduced to demonstrate the 
susceptibility of the Top-N NRS and the robustness of the proposed probabilistic NRS as 
an alternative. Manipulation has been introduced in two stages to study the effects of 
early manipulation and manipulation over large interval of time. In the first case the 
manipulated counts are distributed uniformly between 0 and 100 and in the second case 
manipulated counts are distributed uniformly between 0 and 1500. We consider different 
scenarios based on (a) the reader models (two), (b) the existence of manipulation (two) 
and (c) the selection mechanism (two – count-based and probabilistic) as described in the 
tree in Figure 3.2. The leaves of the tree correspond to specific simulation scenarios. As  
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Figure 3.2 shows, there are 12 leaves for some specific choice of global 
simulation parameters. 
Table 3.1.The model parameters used in the simulation 
 
 
Two of the global simulation parameters are (1) probability of a reader selecting 
an article from    instead of from    (varied as 0.9, 0.5, 0.25, 0.1), and (2) the extent of 
manipulation (high or low, implemented in the simulation as manipulated counts). The 
                                                          
8 Except     and (   )   articles. Counts for these articles were assigned such that      (   )       ( )   . 
This was done deliberately to test how the hard cutoff treats very small initial differences in quality between articles. 
Parameter Value 
No. of Readers 1500 
No. of articles in    10 
No. of articles in    200 
Initial counts of articles
8
 Random Integer between 0 and1000 
Manipulation Counts 10 and 50 
Probability of selection of an article from    ( ) 0.9, 0.5, 0.25, 0.1 
Figure 3.2. Graph for specific selection of global parameters 
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value of simulation parameters used is listed in Table 3.1. For any specific choice of 
these two parameters we have 12 graphs in the results (corresponding to the 12 leaves of 
the tree). 
Table 3.2. Abbreviations used in the figures 
Abbreviation Definition 
M2_d M2 for the     article in Top-N NRS 
M2_u M2 for the (   )   article in Top-N NRS 
p_M2_d M2 for the     article in probabilistic NRS 
p_M2_u M2 for the (   )   article in probabilistic NRS 
M1_count M1 for     and (   )   article in Top-N NRS 
M1_p M1 for     and (   )   article in probabilistic NRS 
  Represents the probability that an article will be read from the    
 
Though we considered different selection probabilities from  , in the context of 
the present research we have developed our discussion for a case of influential (     ) 
NRS (the different simulation paths in the graphs are better seen in color). While the 
probabilities of article selection from such recommended lists are not known in general, 
this special case is interesting since it captures a setting in which NRS particularly 
influence readership. 
Results without manipulation. We summarize our findings based on the 
measures M1 and M2 through selected simulation scenarios. The selected simulation 
results are presented in figure 3.3-3.8, where left panels are for the M2 measure while the 
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rights panels are for the M1 measure. The list of various abbreviations used in these 
figures is given in Table 3.2. 
 
When there is a high probability that a reader will click on the article 
recommended by NRS (or  ), even negligible initial difference between the counts of 
    and (   )   article gets amplified heavily in the count-based NRS, as it is evident 
from the consistent increasing pattern of M1_count in figures 3.3 and 3.4 for both reader 
models. For the probabilistic selection mechanism the value of M1_p remains close to its 
initial value (figures 3.3 & 3.4). 
The path followed by M2 for     and (   )   articles in probabilistic NRS (for 
both reader models) is bounded above and below by the hard cutoff counterpart. In other 
words, for the count-based NRS, the difference of share between the displayed (M2_d) 
and non-displayed (M2_u) article shows a consistent increasing pattern even though 
initial difference between displayed and non-displayed article was negligible (recall that 
the only difference between the     and (   )   article was a single count/click). This 
observation highlights the issue of inequality in success of articles created due to 
presence of hard cutoff NRS. 
Figure 3.3. Simulation results for the user-model 1 without manipulation (P=0.9) 
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In a natural system we expect that the share of counts for articles that are almost 
identical will not vary much. Hence these findings suggest that popular mechanisms 
using hard cutoffs may be susceptible to fundamentally creating, or amplifying, 
differences that may not be desirable. Probabilistic selection on the other hand is a more 
robust mechanism from this perspective. 
Results with manipulation. In this section we will discuss the effects of different 
manipulation scenarios on both NRS. Manipulation counts are uniformly distributed over 
initial 100 (“early manipulation”) and over the entire 1500 article counts (“uniform 
manipulation”). Two manipulation counts considered are 10 (“low”) and 50 (“high”) 
when the system is slightly and heavily manipulated. In total we have four different 
scenarios of manipulation. 
Low fake counts uniformly distributed early. 
Low fake counts uniformly distributed over the entire process. 
High fake counts uniformly distributed early. 
High fake counts uniformly distributed over the entire process. 
Figure 3.4. Simulation results for the user-model 2 without manipulation (P=0.9) 
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First we will discuss the findings of low manipulated counts. For the (   )   
article in   , its count was increased by 10 randomly, but early in the process. However, 
findings in this case were completely reversed from the findings in non-manipulated 
systems, as the reversal of the “M1 paths” in the right panel of figure 3.5 and 3.6 clearly 
shows. 
 
Figure 3.5 presents the case of user-model with random selection of articles from 
the top-10 list, with reading probability      . Both measures M1 and M2 (Figure 3.5) 
suggest that the differences in counts for the manipulated ((   )  ) and the non-
manipulated article (   ) gets amplified even if genuine readers arrive in the system. For 
the second user-model, in which selection of an article is based on   , similar phenomena 
are observed (Figure 3.6). 
This suggests that once a manipulator is successful in making his article appear in 
the   , the implicit feedback mechanism of count-based NRS will help the manipulated 
article gain more counts as more readers arrive. This characteristic of the Top-N NRS 
invites manipulators to put little investment initially to increase the counts of a particular 
article to make it appear in the   , after which no further manipulation may be required.  
Figure 3.5. Simulation results for the user-model 1 with little early manipulation (P=0.9) 
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However, for the probabilistic NRS, manipulation seems to have little or no effect 
(Figure 3.5, 3.6). For low fake counts distributed uniformly, the findings are similar to 
the case of non-manipulated count-based and probabilistic NRS. Hence, it suggests that a 
manipulation strategy may not be successful if the effort of a manipulator is distributed 
over large period of time. 
 
We used the second manipulation strategy with high fake counts to compare the 
performance of both NRS, when the system is heavily attacked by manipulators. In the 
first case, when 50 counts are randomly distributed over first 100 counts, i.e., system is 
heavily manipulated in the early stage. The major benefit of probabilistic NRS appears. 
In all cases, probabilistic NRS produced stable results in which M1 and M2 are not 
amplified after the manipulation, whereas the performance of count-based NRS is highly 
distorted for high probability of selection of articles from   , as seen by declining 
M1_count trajectory(figure 3.7, 3.8). Also, as expected, the manipulator gets higher 
benefits in the second reader model with heavy early manipulation strategy (compare 
right panels of Figure 3.7, 3.8). Finally, for the 50 fake counts distributed over 1500 
counts no clear pattern emerges, however both NRS are similar for low selection 
probability from  . 
Figure 3.6. Simulation results for user-model 2 with little early manipulation (P=0.9) 
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Analytical Results 
To understand how easily amplification can happen for the hard cutoff NRS, and 
the robustness of probabilistic NRS toward amplification, we present insights of 
processes generated through both NRS in a simple setting of a two article case. The 
discussion that follows provides an intuitive explanation of the phenomenon for a single 
time step, which is just for illustrative purposes. The complete proofs have been provided 
in appendix 1. 
Assumptions. 1. Two articles are available for recommendation for readers,  
    (article-a and article-b). 
 
Figure 3.7. Simulation results for the user-model 1 with heavy early manipulation (P=0.9) 
Figure 3.8. Simulation results for the user-model 2 with heavy early manipulation (P=0.9) 
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This assumption helps us to establish the analogy between NRS and urn models. 
2. Reader upon arrival reads the recommended article with probability   or reads 
the other with probability    .  
3. The natural counts for article-  and article-  at time     are given by    
and   respectively.  
The “natural counts” can be interpreted as the overall preferences of readers for 
these two articles before any recommender was put in place. Further, without loss of 
generality we assume      . 
Illustration. Let us denote the initial share of article-  and article-  by    and    
respectively, and it is given by 
  
     
 and 
  
     
. In this simple one time period model the 
NRS results in the amplification of the count of recommended article, if at the next step 
due to recommendation   (  )  
  
     
 . 
Count Based NRS 
The probability of the recommended article being read is given by  . In the hard 
cutoff NRS, article-  is always recommended since it has the higher count. Hence, any 
reading probability   
  
     
 will result in amplification of the counts for the 
recommended article. Consider a case when                    , then hard cutoff 
NRS will be susceptible to amplification if      . Given the two article case here, we 
expect   to be greater than 0.5 for the recommended article. 
Probabilistic NRS 
In probabilistic NRS, article-  can be read in two ways. The article is in the 
recommended list (with probability   ), and the reader chooses to read the recommended 
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article (with probability  ). Or, article-  can be in the other list RL (with probability   
  ), and the reader chooses to read the un-recommended article (with probability    ). 
The total probability that an article-  will be read is therefore given by  
 (    )       (   )  (    )                 
So, in the case of probabilistic NRS, the amplification will happen for the 
recommended article if  
 (
  
     
)  (   ) (
  
     
)  
  
     
 
      (     )     
  (     )         
The above condition will never be true for any probability p. It is easy to see that 
when the counts are similar, probabilistic NRS does not create amplification (reading 
probabilities will both be 0.5).  
Building on this, below we present results for the more general case where we 
examine counts at the end of   iterations. 
Proposition 1. In the Top-N NRS total expected count (            (  
 )) for 
article-a after    iterations is given by (     ). 
Proposition 2. In the probabilistic NRS total expected count 
(            (  
 )) for article-a after    iterations is bounded by the interval (     ). 
Where     (
       
          
) (
     
 
)  
       
 
 and  
    
  
     
(       ). 
We discuss the implications of these propositions shortly. Before doing so, we 
briefly comment on the proofs (presented in the appendix). Proposition 1 has been 
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established through a simple binomial process. Whereas for Proposition 2, modeling 
based on an urn framework from probability theory has been used. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only prior work that has used urn models in the context of recommender 
systems is Fleder and Hosanagar (2009) where they study the impact of recommender 
systems on sales diversity. However, our use of Pólya’s and Bernard Friedman’s urn 
models to derive analytical results is novel and our analytical results have been 
established in a substantially different manner. Below we discuss our use of these urn 
models in the proofs. 
The probability of article-a being recommended in probabilistic NRS is given 
by    , where     represents the share of the article-a at any given time t; initially we 
have         (assumption 3). 
For     the total probability that the article-a being read at time t in 
probabilistic NRS is  
  (    )        (   )  (     )                                        ( )  
Each time an article is read, its count is increased by 1. We also define two 
parallel processes that start with the same initial condition. However, for these processes 
reading probabilities (i.e.,  ) for the recommended article is given by 0 and 1 
respectively, at each time step. We denote reading probabilities for these processes at 
each time step as,  
   (    )                                                                                       ( )  
and    (    )                                                                                    ( ) 
Let us denote the count of article-a being   
 
,    
 
and    
 
 after   time steps for 
the processes defined by equations (1), (2) and (3) respectively. Say,    denotes the total 
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counts of articles in the system at any given time  . The value of    at a given time    is 
known          in the present framework and is equal to        .  
Since,    (    )    (    )     (    ), the following relation holds for the 
processes defined by equations (1), (2) and (3)   
 (   
 )   (  
 )   (   
 )                                                                  ( ) 
 (   
 )  (   
 ) are the values of    and     respectively, mentioned in Proposition 
2; that will be derived in this section based on the urn formulation.  
But, before that, we present the urn problem as described by Bernard Friedman 
(Freedman 1965). An urn contains    white balls and    black balls at time  . One ball 
is drawn at random and then replaced, while   balls of the same color as the ball drawn 
and the   balls of the opposite color are added to the urn. Now, let us consider two cases 
that will be used in the present research.  
Case1:     describes the Pólya Urn mechanism in the above section where 
selection probability of a white ball (and vice versa for a black ball) at each time step is 
given by its share – which is a characteristic of the problem proposed by Pólya to model 
contagion (Eggenberger and Pólya 1923). When    (    )      (i.e., share of the 
article ‘a’), the path followed by   
 
 is obtained through the Pólya Urn mechanism 
with    .  
Case2: The special case of Friedman’s Urn with         helps us to 
establish lower bound for  (  
 ). In this case the selection probability of a ball is given 
by   (                          ). When   (    )  (     ) 
(i.e.  {                        }), the path followed by   
 
 is obtained through special 
case of Friedman’s Urn formulation described here. 
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Figure 3.9 pictorially depicts the urn processes. The proofs of the propositions are 
completed in the appendix. 
 
 
 Implications. From propositions 1 and 2 we have  (  
 )         and 
(
       
          
) (
     
 
)  
       
 
  (  
 )     
  
     
  
Now consider a case where NRS has fairly strong influence on reading behavior 
i.e.,     and the difference in the sufficiently large natural counts after which articles ‘   
and     make into NRS is negligible i.e.,        , in particular let us assume    
    . So, the approximate value of expected count of article-  in hard cutoff NRS and 
probabilistic NRS is given by 
 (  
 )                                                                           ( )  
and  
  
     
 
       
 
  (  
 
)       (
    
     
)              ( )  
Figure 3.9. The Pólya urn                                        A Bernard Friedman urn 
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Increase in the counts of Top-N selection and probabilistic selection NRS due to 
recommendation can be obtained through subtracting the initial count of article-  in 
expressions (5) and (6). So, we have 
 (  
 ) (    )                                                                 ( ) and            
  
     
 
   
 
  (  
 
)  (    )  (
    
     
)       ( )  
Using approximation 
    
     
 
 
 
 in expression (8) for sufficiently large m gives us 
following condition 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (  
 
)  (    )  
 
 
                          ( )   
 For large  , from (7) and (9)  
 (  
 ) (    )            (  
 
)  (    )  
 
 
 
So, from the above expressions we conclude that for two equally good articles, 
probabilistic NRS is less susceptible to artificial amplification in counts for the 
recommended article, whereas hard cutoff NRS generates processes that leads to highly 
amplified counts for the recommended article when the NRS is fairly influential (  is 
very high). This is the case since two articles with the same counts initially should 
increase their respective counts by ~     at the end of   iterations, which happens with 
the probabilistic mechanism only. 
NRS Manipulation 
Proposition 3. (Effectiveness of Early Manipulation). Consider two scenarios in 
which an article is manipulated once at two different time steps    and    such that    
  (            ) for any NRS; where   represents the total number of new counts 
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for both articles over the entire time. We call these manipulation strategies     
and   . Then for any NRS (Top-  or probabilistic),     will be more beneficial for a 
manipulator than   . 
 
On the contrary, let us assume that (late) manipulation at    will be more 
beneficial for a manipulator than   . Then we can find a new time point   
        such 
that       and       (     )         which will be more beneficial for 
manipulation than implementing manipulation at    and hence also from    (difference 
between   
  and    is   ). Applying the same argument, again we can obtain a time point 
  
                    such that        and           will be more 
beneficial for manipulation than implementing manipulation at    and hence from   . 
Repeatedly applying the same argument we can find an integer   
    
     
 such that 
applying the above argument   times gives us a time point      will be beneficial for 
manipulation. Hence under the above assumptions, a manipulator will get maximum 
benefit without introducing any manipulated count in the system. This cannot be the case 
since the act of manipulation in this model provides a strictly higher count for the article 
Figure 3.10. Illustration for proposition 3 
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being manipulated and is assumed to have no additional cost to the manipulator. Hence 
by contradiction the proposition holds.  
To examine the bounds for both Top-  and probabilistic NRS, we consider a case 
in which manipulation is introduced in both NRS at a very early stage. Let both NRS 
operate until   total new counts are received in the system. At extreme if all   fake counts 
are introduced consecutively at the very early stage, then the total count of article   after 
manipulation will be    . Further assume that manipulation   introduced in the 
system is such that (    )    . After manipulation, both NRS can be viewed to 
operate as genuine NRS, but with distorted initial counts    (    )  for article-  and 
article   respectively. 
Proposition 4. For a manipulator who injects   fake counts in the probabilistic 
NRS, the increase in counts of article   after manipulation is bounded by 
    
       
(  
 ) where   is the total number of new counts for both articles over the entire time. 
Proof: We denote the distorted share of article   and   at time   after injection of 
manipulation as    
  and    
  respectively. Clearly    
     
  and probability that the 
article   will be read at time   will have following property:  
   
 (    )       
  (   )  (     
 )                         (  ) 
       
 (    )     
  
Let us denote the count of article   being   
          
  
 after   time steps (i.e., 
(   ) time steps after manipulation) for the processes where    
 (    ) is given by 
{     
  (   )  (     
 )}         
  respectively.  For these processes the expected 
count of article   after   time steps satisfies the following relation.  
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 (    
 )   (     
 
)                                                        (  ) 
For the random processes when    
 (    )     
  (i.e.    ), the path followed 
by the count of article   is similar to the Pólya’s urn mechanism as discussed earlier. 
But, in the present case, initial count of articles ‘a’ and ‘b’ has been changed to    
and    . The expression for  (     
  ) can be obtained in the similar way as discussed 
in appendix (for proposition 2) to obtain the upper bound (i.e.   ). So,  
 (     
  )  (    )  (   )
    
       
           (  ) 
Using the inequality (11) and the result (12)  
 (    
 )  (    )   
    
       
(   )                 (  ) 
Corollary. When the distorted initial counts of articles   and   is     (   
 ) respectively, the increase in the expected count of article   after manipulation in hard 
cutoff NRS is equal to (   )            is the total number of new counts of both 
articles over the entire time. 
The above result can be established with simple binomial model used in 
proposition 1 over     time steps with    
   (    )  initally. Let   
  
 represents the 
total count of article   after     iteration in the hard cutoff NRS. Then 
 (  
  )        (   )                          (  ) 
Implications. When NRS has fairly strong influence on the reading behavior, i.e., 
    a manipulator can drive the majority of the reader’s attention towards the 
manipulated article as illustrated in expression (14)  (  
 )  (    )      for any 
  that satisfies the condition (    )    .  
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For illustration consider a special case when        . For this condition by 
injecting any fake count               initially, the hard cutoff NRS can be 
completely rigged. Whereas, in case of probabilistic NRS  (    
  )  (    )  
    
       
(   ), and hence its performance is not disturbed by small manipulation 
efforts, as for small value of   the expression in (13) can be approximated as  
 
 
 for 
large  . 
Hence in a special case, we show analytically that (1) early manipulation can pay 
off well for a manipulator, and (2) that this is true only for the Top-N recommender, since 
the probabilistic mechanism is shown to be robust against such manipulation. 
Analysis of Probabilistic NRS 
In this section we further analyze probabilistic NRS in two ways. First, we present 
and discuss an accuracy-distortion tradeoff. Then, we compare it against a novel 
adaptation of the Influence Limiter algorithm. 
The accuracy/distortion tradeoff.  
Accuracy (MAE).  One drawback of the probabilistic recommendations is that it 
potentially chooses articles to recommend that might not be in the current “best” list. To 
quantify that loss in the recommendation process, the Top-N and probabilistic NRS are 
compared based on the “quality” (measured as popularity) of the articles appearing in the 
recommended list. A widely used measure for this purpose is mean absolute error 
(MAE). It represents an efficient means to measure the statistical accuracy of predictions 
of articles appearing in the Top-  recommendation (Ziegler, et al. 2005). Let us denote 
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the count of     article appearing in count-based NRS at     time step as    
  and in 
probabilistic NRS as   
 
. The MAE metric denoted as | | is defined as, 
| |  
(∑    
  ∑    
 
  )
∑    
 
 
 
In the above expression, ∑    
 
  and ∑    
 
  represent the sum of counts of all 
articles that appear in count-based and probabilistic NRS respectively, at the     time 
step. The MAE metric has been averaged over the number of iterations, as the simulation 
progresses.  
| ̅|  
 
| |
∑
(∑    
  ∑    
 
  )
∑    
 
 
 
   
                      (  ) 
This metric presents accuracy loss in terms of “high” ranked articles assuming 
that users will have little or no interest in the “low” ranked articles, averaged over the 
complete simulation. 
Distortion (KL). Assuming that the initial share of articles represents the “true” 
preference of readers, the distortion created by each NRS in comparison with their initial 
share is given by                  (  ) distortion measure (Kullback and Leibler 
1951).  Let us denote the probability distribution for articles in each NRS (probabilistic 
and Top-N NRS) at the iteration   as   (  ). Then the    distortion for the articles 
{          } is given by.   
   ( ||  )  ∑ (  )   (
 (  )
  (  )
)
 
   
                             (  ) 
In other words, the above expression represents the inefficiency of the distribution 
 , when the true distribution of articles is   (given initially).  
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Since, the emergence of counts of the articles in a given NRS is a probabilistic 
process, the data was generated through fifteen replications of the complete simulation 
for the different values of reading probability for both reader models. The results 
discussed below are based on the mean value of metric over fifteen replications, plotted 
against different choice of reading probabilities. 
Considering the performance based on MAE (equation 15), we observe that Top-
N seems to perform better than probabilistic NRS (Figure 3.11), as the findings are 
established from both reader models in the simulation. However, under the second metric 
(KL, equation 16) clearly probabilistic NRS outperforms Top-N NRS for both reader 
models (Figure 3.12). These findings present the tradeoff between the two NRS. While 
probabilistic NRS seems to have a small accuracy loss (in terms of counts of articles it 
recommends) it is more true to the natural shares of the articles and does not create 
distortions which otherwise can occur. 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Mean Absolute Error vs.  Reading Probability 
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After the counts of articles have achieved a steady state in a natural system, we 
expect that the share of articles will not deviate much. This behavior of system is 
achieved through probabilistic NRS, with a slight loss in recommendation accuracy. 
Comparison to an “adapted” influence limiter heuristic. We have discussed 
the advantage of probabilistic mechanism in terms of robustness towards manipulability. 
However, one limitation in the news recommender research is the lack of benchmark to 
which the performance of probabilistic mechanism can be compared towards 
manipulation. So the approach of Resnick et al. (2007) has been adapted in our context to 
compare the effects of manipulation in NRS.  
As mentioned earlier, the Influence Limiter algorithm (Resnick and Sami 2007) 
generates item recommendations controlling rater’s influence on recommender systems 
through reputation acquired over time. The reputation of a rater is updated based on 
rating provided by him to an item and the               determined through the 
prediction made to a target user compared to the actual preference of the target user.   
In this research our focus has been on the counts of articles, and the reader’s 
individual behavior (or reading pattern) has been left out for ease of exposition. Hence, 
Figure 3.12. Mean KL distortion vs. reading probability (both Reader Models) 
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the approach of Resnick and Sami (2007) cannot directly be used. Instead, we limit the 
influence of fake counts to generate article recommendations. In a similar vein, it should 
be also noted that in the present analysis counts of articles is updated, instead of rater’s 
reputation. 
In our approach, we assign reputation for each article based on prior information 
about the average inter arrival time of two consecutive clicks for the recommended 
article, the total counts received by the article, and the time period of observation in 
which influence limiting process operates. The influence limiting process operates in a 
pre-defined time interval. An article is assigned a reputation based on observation during 
this period.  After this time interval new counts received by an article are updated based 
on its reputation score.  
We assume that the average time interval of two consecutive counts received by a 
recommended article is less than the average time interval of two consecutive counts 
received by the other articles in the system. A measure     has been introduced that limits 
the influence of a manipulator in the top   NRS. For any article   at time    it is defined 
as,     
              (     )     (  
     
  (     )
)                                                        (  ) 
Influence limiting process operates between a pre-selected time intervals (     ), 
and can be determined through the designer’s experience or other appropriate choice can 
be the time interval when manipulation activity is most observed. For every          , 
an article     reputation is updated as given in equation 17. In the expression    
represents the average time interval that is “reasonable” between two consecutive counts 
received by a recommended article in the top   NRS (this can be determined through 
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the arrival distribution of counts of the recommended articles), and     is the number of 
counts received by the article   in the time interval given by  (     ). After   , at any 
given time point    the new count received by the article   (denoted as    
 ) passes 
through an influence limiting process to generate a modified count given by  ̃   as 
described below in the pseudo code. ( ̃   represents count received before    ). After   , 
each new count received by any of the articles, is modified through is reputation     at 
time   . When      , all weight is on    
  i.e., article   has full credibility. 
An Adapted Influence Limiter Heuristic: 
1. Get  ̃   for each article at      
2. For each article  ,       
3. For each   , when         and       
a. For each article   
i.        (     ) 
ii.  ̃    ̃            
  
iii.              
  
b. End for 
4. End for 
 
Let us consider the first user model in our simulation (when the reader performs 
random selection of an article from the recommended list). Also it should be noted that in 
the context of manipulation, we are concerned about articles appearing in the 
recommended list.  The initial 100 time steps have been selected as the observation 
period before implementing the modified count (the influence limiting heuristic) for each 
article. The selection of an article from the recommended list is performed randomly, 
hence the expected count that an article will receive over initial 100 time steps will 
be( 
   
  
)        , where   is the selected reading probability in the simulation. 
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Hence, the expected time interval between two consecutive counts received by an article 
in Top   NRS is given by   (
   
    
)  
  
 
.  Based on our choice of time period for the 
observation       will be   . Hence, the reputation of an article   at time    will be given 
by (equation (17)) 
       (  
    
   (     )
) 
As established earlier, the major issue of interest is manipulation at the early stage 
(which was shown to be more effective for the manipulator). Hence, variants of 
manipulation examined are heavy and low early manipulation. As before the articles of 
interest in this are also the     and (   )   articles in the list.  
 
The results suggest that in the case of extreme manipulations, the proposed 
adapted influence limiter heuristic performs similar to probabilistic NRS (figure 3.13, left 
panel). This seems to be by the design of the adapted influence limiter heuristic - as the 
manipulator injects more fake counts for the target article, this leads to less reputation for 
it (   ).  In turn, new counts received by the manipulated article cause less cumulative 
Figure 3.13. Comparison of Manipulation based on M1 
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increase in its count. However, small manipulation effort (especially if an article has just 
missed the cutoff for Top-N and the manipulator is in a position to determine this) may 
go undetected in case of the adapted influence limiter (figure 3.13, right panel). Here, 
probabilistic NRS is still robust. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In case of news articles, where majority of queries are driven by front page 
display or recommended articles, we expect popularity to exhibit some kind of power law 
distribution. The rationale for power-law distribution of popularity, especially in web-
based systems, has been suggested by Easley and Kleinberg (2010). This assumption of 
popularity is also consistent with the effect of social influence discussed by Salganik, et 
al. (2006). In their experiment for artificial music market, they found that in the presence 
of social influence, such as media sites, we observe greater inequality – popular entities 
are more popular and unpopular entities are less popular. From a given power-law 
distribution its corresponding Zipf distribution can also be obtained (Adamic 2000). 
To validate the popularity distribution of articles, we obtained data on popularity 
of articles from DailyMe Inc., a company that provides news personalization technology 
to a large number of media sites. There are five datasets from five different local news 
websites serving markets in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New York, Colorado and 
Massachusetts, collected during the period of February 2012 to April 2012. The data 
provided listed specific articles along with cookie IDs and time stamps read across the 
five different local news websites.  
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Figure 3.14 shows the normalized frequency distribution on a log-log scale using 
the logarithmic binning with multiplier of 2 – similar to the procedure described by 
Newman (2005). The X-axis corresponds to natural log value of bins and Y-axis 
corresponds to the natural log value of normalized frequencies. Data from these five real 
local news websites show the pattern of power-law in popularity. Based on the findings, 
Figure 3.14. log-log plot for popularity of articles at five different sites 
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the power-law exponent used to discuss results in the sensitivity analysis is given 
by      . We used this exponent value in the modified simulation model, where the 
initial distribution of article counts was generated using power-law distribution with 
exponent 1.7. We note that these are relatively smaller local news Web sites and we do 
not therefore make broader generalizations about the power law based on these alone. 
However, it provides valuable insights for this sensitivity analysis. 
The detailed information about data analysis, model implementation and findings 
in this case has been provided in appendix 2. Our main findings from the sensitivity 
analyses were that probabilistic selection continues to offer significant benefits compared 
to Top-N when it comes to mitigating count amplification as well as offering resistance to 
manipulation. However, the continued benefit from manipulation (i.e., after manipulation 
activity stops) is lower in this case than was the case under the uniform distribution. 
Social Desirability 
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that the probabilistic selection 
mechanism is effective in addressing some of the key limitations of the Top-N NRS. 
These limitations were (1) amplifying the negligible initial difference in the counts of 
    and (   )   articles (2) less choice of articles offered to readers’ by top-N list and 
(3) susceptibility to manipulation by artificially inflating the count of a target article.  
Still, it is difficult to argue universal superiority of one of the two selection 
processes for recommendations. For example, when an implementer is facing a situation 
with suspected manipulation activities or she wants to create a set of diverse 
recommendations in the recommended list, then surely, the probabilistic mechanism will 
be more desirable. However, in a situation where an implementer wants to maximize the 
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short-term revenue or to allow a genuine article to (perhaps deservedly) become more 
popular, then the Top-N NRS may be the appropriate choice. 
One approach in framing this issue is to ask which mechanism is socially more 
desirable. Clearly the choice of a particular mechanism depends on the goal of an 
implementer and desired effect he wants to create through those recommendations. 
Researches in other contexts have also framed it in this lens. For instance, Salganik, et al. 
(2006) highlight the problem related with the measure of quality, through an 
experimental approach, in the presence of social influence.  
In this research we do not answer this issue directly. Instead we view this as a 
control that the media owners can exercise by their choice of parameters. If viewed in 
this manner, the natural question is to ask if there can be some continuous spectrum of 
control that can be used (possibly fine-tuned) by managers to achieve any outcome or 
behavior that they may desire. Below we show that this is possible. By introducing a 
feedback parameter, we can offer managers an elegant approach to control the behavior 
of the system such that it can operate in the entire spectrum. We provide details below.  
We extend the approach of probabilistic selection to provide greater flexibility for 
an implementer. In this modified approach, the selection probability of an article –‘a’ 
having count   ( ) at time  , is given by   
   ( )   
  
 ( )
∑     ( )
                        (  ) 
One advantage of this modified probabilistic approach (equation 18) is that we 
can generate different known selection processes through tuning the parameter   in a 
single unified equation. To understand the behavior of systems for the modified selection 
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process, we consider different values that   can take, and briefly explain the selection 
processes corresponding to those values. 
   : In this case all articles have the same probability of being selected in the 
display list, which essentially simulates a random recommender. Also, in this case we do 
not incorporate any information generated through user’s interaction with NRS. This 
selection process can be desirable when an implementer wants to completely eliminate 
the effect of social influence from NRS. 
     : For the given probability function, the number of times an article 
appears in DL will tend to be in equal proportion for all articles after very large time 
interval. In practice, values of the feedback parameter in this range may have very limited 
application. 
   : In this case, the count evolution process can be analyzed as a combination 
of Pólya and Bernard Freedman urn problems in a special case. This particular case has 
been discussed in detail throughout this paper as the main probabilistic selection 
mechanism. As mentioned earlier, the selection mechanism in this case is desirable to 
generate an even distribution in popularity, to generate diverse recommendations and to 
thwart manipulation efforts. 
     : For    , we will have a system with positive feedback for the 
articles with high counts. In other words, the NRS generates recommendations such that 
the articles with high counts will have an even higher probability of being selected in the 
display list (DL) at the next time step. In this case, after a finite time, the probabilistic 
NRS will behave similar to Top-N NRS i.e., N articles with high counts will always be 
selected for recommendation. The feedback based approach in this range is desirable to 
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mitigate the issue of penalizing the marginal next article (the case with count based 
selection process), and at the same time maintaining the effect of Top-N selection. 
   : In this case, the probabilistic recommendation generated by equation 18, 
is essentially a replication of most popular NRS (i.e., identical to the Top-N mechanism 
considered earlier in this paper). To understand this, let us consider the expression given 
by equation 18,  
   ( )   
  
 ( )
∑     ( )
 
 
  ∑ (
  ( )
  ( )
)
 
   
 
We assume that all articles have different counts
9
. Then,    such that  
  ( )
  ( )
 
         (
  ( )
  ( )
)
 
  . So, for the article with highest count (among those which are 
not yet selected for DL), the selection probability in DL will be 1. Hence, N probabilistic 
selections in this case correspond to selection of N articles with decreasing order of their 
counts. 
The proposed feedback mechanism in this section provides implementers 
flexibility in selecting of articles and also allows users to process the recommended 
information in different ways. Depending on various situations, we can reduce the rich 
get richer effects for articles, or amplify them, or steer them in different directions (with 
articles with low counts becoming more popular for    ) by help of the parameter  . 
Therefore, the use of the above feedback model, provides a broader range of control that 
can be exerted to optimize the behavior of the system for a particular manager. We defer 
analytical results and a more detailed study of this to future work. 
                                                          
9 Without loss of generality. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
There has been growing evidence of the influence of News Recommendation 
Systems on users. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) (Warren and 
Jurgensen 2007) had noted that the influence of NRS is sparking a new form of “payola” 
as marketers try to get more votes and allow users to vote for their favorite submissions. 
This phenomenon has been further propelled by social networking applications such as 
Facebook and Twitter, as noted by The Economist in recent review of news industry 
(Economist-b 2011). As per the article published in WSJ, the aggregation process of 
news through NRS is also giving rise to an “obsessive sub-culture of a few active users 
who just purely for the thrill of it, are trolling the web-space for news and ideas to share 
with others”. For example, a Reddit user is known for “scoping” drove about 100,000 
visitors to one amateur photographer’s website (Warren and Jurgensen 2007).  There are 
also some marketing companies in existence who promise clients that they can get a 
client front-page exposure in exchange for a fee (Warren and Jurgensen 2007). In other 
cases users can also buy Facebook fans (likes) 
("http://socialnetworksolutionz.com/index.html) or tweets ("http://pay4tweet.com), to 
gain popularity. 
In light of all this, news recommender systems should be particularly careful to 
avoid common manipulative strategies. At present, the articles with highest count or 
popularity are displayed on the front page prominently on most news sites and these are 
seen by millions of people. It is evident from the findings we present in this research that 
the practice of using a “hard cutoff” is in particular a potentially troublesome one. In 
addition to unduly penalizing the possibly equally good next article that missed this 
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cutoff, this system is quite vulnerable to manipulation. A simple probabilistic mechanism 
can instead be used to present popular articles and has some desirable properties as we 
show and study in this paper.  
Practically, implementers may instead choose a more flexible mechanism that 
may offer the benefits of both Top-N and probabilistic selection. This can be done using a 
parameterized extension of the probabilistic selection mechanism, as noted in the chapter. 
We defer analytical and empirical treatment of the parameterized extension to future 
work. 
In the present research we have established our main results based on simulation 
and theoretical results using widely studied urn models. The performance of the common 
Top-N recommender and the probabilistic counterpart proposed here has been analyzed 
based on two different metrics. Further the tradeoff from using the probabilistic 
recommender is also shown. Finally, an adapted influence limiter algorithm has been 
introduced, and its performance has been compared with its probabilistic counterpart. We 
have also, in a sensitivity analysis driven by real data from local news Web sites, shown 
the robustness of our main results to distributional assumptions. To our knowledge, the 
problem studied here is novel and these are all unique contributions of our research. 
The probabilistic NRS has practical implications in terms of providing a better 
way of utilizing information generated through users in comparison to the current Top-N 
NRS in the recommendation process. The present research also has policy implications, 
as government and policy think-tanks are increasingly concerned about the entire process 
of news generation, curation and distribution (Economist-a 2011, Loretta and Brian 
2011). In an only somewhat light vein, Burt Herman writes in a prediction for the 
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Niemann Journalism Lab that “in the coming year, social media journalists will 
“#Occupythenews”.  
It should be also noted that although we have derived our results in a framework 
of discrete time steps, statistical distribution of urn functions has been widely studied in 
continuous case. For example, (Freedman 1965), discusses the asymptotic behavior urn 
of functions. In future research, these functions can be explored to address other issues 
related to recommender systems research.  
Other possible extensions of the present research could be to study the impact of 
hard cutoff in personalized recommended systems.  Although for a given user, even in the 
context personalized recommendation, the issue of hard cutoff still exists, it would be 
interesting to investigate, to what extent count amplification can be mitigated at 
aggregate level.  
On a broader level, algorithms are increasingly in control of what news articles get 
shown to which user. Some, such as Eli Pariser, the author of the popular book “The 
Filter Bubble”, believes this to be a potential problem. The popular argument here is that 
algorithms will influence thought by controlling news, and that such algorithms tend to 
become hyper-personalized, creating “bubbles”, where each user is in a possibly 
independent bubble. Others, including many academics in a panel at the recent 2011ACM 
Conference on Recommender Systems in Chicago, believe this problem to be overblown, 
and that algorithms can both personalize as well as provide adequate diversity to limit 
such problems. In one of the earliest works in the IS area for instance, Adomavicius and 
Kwon (2011) present methods to enhance diversity. It is in this context though that some 
important research problems emerge. Studying the specific characteristics of news 
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recommendation algorithms is an important area of research, given the fact that news 
indeed shapes public opinion on a variety of topics and that algorithms are increasingly 
influencing its distribution.  
As a last thought, while comparing probabilistic approaches for selection in 
recommender systems, we note that a similar argument can be made not just for “news” 
recommendations, but for any recommender that uses a hard cutoff. For instance, 
Amazon.com’s product recommendations most likely use hard cutoffs based on results 
generated from collaborative filtering (Linden, et al. 2003), and can perhaps therefore 
benefit from using probabilistic variants such as described in this paper. Currently, the 
“Customers who also bought this item also bought” features a list of specific 
recommendations on each page – the fate of the “next” product in that list that misses 
such a cutoff is similar to the question studied in this research. However we leave the 
treatment of this for future work since other types of products (e.g., movies, consumer 
products) may have other unique characteristics or constraints. 
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Chapter 4 : Empirical Analysis of Outsourcing  
Effects of IT Backgrounds of Project Owners on the Organizational Impacts of IT 
Outsourcing Projects 
Introduction. There has been a long standing debate on the issue of the value 
added by CIOs in a firm. For example, in one of the earliest articles on this issue, Earl 
and Feeny (1994) discuss both cases where IT is considered an “asset” or a “liability” in a 
firm. Further, they observe that “the CIO’s ability to add value is the biggest factor in 
determining whether the organization views IT as an asset or liability”. Subsequently 
more attention has been paid to investigate the role played by CIOs, as both the growing 
and the shrinking status of CIOs have been observed (Mateyaschuk, 1999; Overby, 
2003). More recently, Luftman and Kempaiah (2008) have noted the large IT budgets 
managed by CIOs, and their contributions in shaping a firm’s strategy. 
To identify the mechanisms by which CIOs (project owners with the tile of CIO 
or an executive with IT background) add value to firms, we address the following 
question in this chapter: Does the IT background of project owners who manage system 
integration outsourcing projects, affect firm performance in terms of cost savings, 
revenue, and profitability, through the projects they manage?  
System integration (SI) is a process of interlinking different software applications 
running on different hardware platforms. SI is common in the context of blended non-
standard systems – the case often encountered in IT outsourcing.  
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Although firms enter into different kinds of outsourcing contracts such as 
application management, business process outsourcing, SI outsourcing, and network and 
desktop maintenance, SI outsourcing is most widespread both in terms of the volume and 
the number of contracts. Further, blended non-standard systems that require SI, call for 
special skills with deep technical background to be successful. This environment 
therefore provides great opportunity for the IT background of executives to impact 
project outcomes. 
Related work. The importance of CIOs in an organization has been examined in 
the information systems (IS) literature through various approaches. Feeny, Edwards, and 
Simpson (1992) have used explanatory framework to improve the quality of CEO/CIO 
relationship with emphasis on the extensive IT background of CIOs.  Armstrong and 
Sambamurthy (1999) have examined the influence of (i) quality of senior leadership, (ii) 
sophistication of IT infrastructures, and (iii) organizational size on IT assimilation. Their 
findings provide robust evidence on the impacts of CIOs’ business and IT knowledge on 
IT assimilation.  
Chatterjee, Richardson, and Zmud (2001) have used an event study methodology 
with capital asset pricing model to examine market reactions to the announcements of 
newly created CIO positions.  They find strong support for positive reactions from the 
market place for the announcements of newly created CIO positions. Using knowledge-
based and resource-based views, Armstrong and Sambamurthy (1999) argue that IT 
knowledge of senior leadership teams significantly enhance firm’s IT assimilation. Based 
on the organizational studies literature, Bassellier, Benbasat, and Reich (2003) have 
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identified knowledge and experience both as important factors in determining the 
competency of business managers in IT.  
The threats and opportunities related to the increasing involvement of non-IT 
managers in IT outsourcing process has been discussed by Gefen, Ragowsky, Licker, and 
Stern (2011). In the similar context, Westerman and Hunter (2007) have noted that non-
IT managers are mostly unaware of the need to manage IT risks. 
Banker, Hu, Pavlou, and Luftman (2011) have empirically examined the CIO 
reporting structure and suggest that this structure not be used as a standard for the 
strategic role of IT in a firm. They also observe the role of CIOs gradually becoming 
more influential as IT increasingly plays a pivotal role in a firm’s success (Banker et al., 
2011).  Aral and Weill (2007) argue that different types of IT investments may impact 
different aspects of firm performance. 
Research hypotheses. While prior research highlighted above has reported on the 
aggregate impacts of the CIO role, in this chapter, we look at the mechanisms by which 
CIOs contribute to organizations. As mentioned earlier, we do this by investigating the 
contributions of CIOs in managing system integration IT outsourcing projects. We 
hypothesize that in managing systems integration IT outsourcing projects, executives 
who have a background in IT, are better positioned to manage the complexities, and 
identify constraints and opportunities to meet various project goals. This knowledge 
improves their negotiation stance since technical knowledge is an important ingredient 
for effective monitoring,(Gore, Matsunaga, & Eric Yeung, 2011; Keen, 1991). 
Cost reduction. Cost reduction is one of the main reasons for IT outsourcing. This 
is driven by the common belief that an outside vendor can provide better or same level of 
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service at lower costs (Smith, Mitra, & Narasimhan, 1998). Since vendors serve many 
clients, they incur lower per unit cost due to economies of scale, the benefits of which are 
often passed on to client firms in the case of competitive bidding.   For firms, cost 
efficiency is defined both in terms of operating expenses and overhead expenses. From 
empirical evidence in other domains suggesting that technical expertise is an important 
input for effective monitoring, it should follow that, the technical expertise of project 
owner in the relevant domain (IT skills for systems integration outsourcing) would 
impact the monitoring and negotiation skills of the project owner. The direct impact of 
such improved monitoring and negotiations is likely to be lower costs. Since IT costs are 
largely included as part of SG&A (selling, general and administrative) expenses, project 
ownership by IT executives should lead to a reduction in a firm’s SG&A expenses 
compared to project ownership by executives with other backgrounds. Further, superior 
implementation is expected to simplify operations and improve operational efficiency, 
reducing operating costs. This leads to our first set of hypotheses: 
H1a: Reduction in a firm’s operating expenses will be greater for system 
integration outsourcing projects when a project owner is an executive with an IT 
background in comparison to an executive with a non-IT background.  
H1b: Reduction in a firm’s selling, general & administrative expenses will be 
greater for system integration outsourcing projects when the project owner is an 
executive with an IT background in comparison to an executive with a non-IT 
background. 
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Revenue. The contributions of IT outsourcing investments have been evaluated in 
terms of firm productivity (Han, Kauffman, & Nault, 2011; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992). 
Further, it has been established that IT outsourcing has positive contributions to the 
industrial output (Han et al., 2011). Project ownership of system integration IT 
outsourcing projects by IT executives can impact revenues in various ways. First, the 
deeper IT knowledge of the project owner is likely to lead to better project selection 
based on alignment with the organization’s capabilities, superior requirements gathering 
and vendor selection, leading to better implementations, which could improve the 
organization’s order-processing capabilities. Another channel for revenue enhancement 
comes from the deployment of cost savings achieved through superior project monitoring 
to other revenue enhancing IT projects. Hence, we propose our next hypothesis 
H2: A firm’s revenue will be greater when system integration outsourcing project 
owners are executives with an IT background in comparison to executives with a non-IT 
background. 
Profitability. The first two hypotheses lead to our third hypothesis relating to firm 
profits. Well positioned outsourcing helps a firm to improve its profitability by staffing, 
capabilities, facilities and payroll (Jiang, Frazier, & Prater, 2006). By simultaneously 
lowering costs through superior monitoring of SI outsourcing projects and increasing 
revenues from deploying cost savings, CIOs can also improve firm profitability. Hence 
we propose the following research hypothesis for the profitability of a firm from systems 
integration outsourcing: 
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H3: A firm will experience higher profits when IT system-integration outsourcing 
projects are managed by executives with an IT background in comparison to executives 
with a non-IT background. 
Data collection. The economic structure of a firm integrates the knowledge and 
skill sets of a variety of individuals in the production of value-added products and 
services. Following this view, we examine the changes in the financial characteristics of a 
firm before and after the IT systems integration outsourcing contract is signed. Consistent 
with prior research we use financial measures based on cost efficiency, revenues and 
profitability (Jiang et al., 2006; Smith et al., 1998). 
We use data from various sources to test our hypotheses. Information about the 
size of SI outsourcing contract, customer (client) name, project owner title, customer 
industry, contract start date and contract duration are obtained from IDC BuyerPulse 
Deals Database. The IDC database, which is one of the largest repositories for 
outsourcing contracts signed in the US, maintains records of different outsourcing 
contracts announced by firms as well as contract related data. It is used by IT firms to 
generate leads by identifying expiring contracts. 
We obtain financial measures for each publicly traded firm whose contract 
information is contained in the IDC database from COMPUSTAT. All measures are 
adjusted to 2005 constant dollars using implicit price deflators. The data for implicit price 
deflators and the economy wide gross domestic product (GDP) is obtained from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). All quantities are expressed in million dollars.  
The total volume of system integration outsourcing projects (including 
governmental and privately held firms) signed since 1995 is seen in Figure 4.1. 
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Clearly, it can be observed that the volume of SI outsourcing contract increased 
significantly over the last decade. Two troughs since 2000 correspond to the time periods 
immediately after the tech-bubble and the 2008 financial crisis. 
Explanatory variables. Descriptions on the operationalization of explanatory 
variables follow in this section. For all the measures described below, subscript   denotes 
the year in which an outsourcing contract was signed. 
Contract Value: The dollar amount of a specific contract is divided by the contract 
length and then summed over all the active contracts a firm had in a given year. Hence, 
the total contract value for a firm in a year is given by:  
               ∑ (
                             
                           
)
               
                 ( ) 
Project Owner: To examine the contribution of executives with IT-background in 
SI project management, we divide project owners in two groups: (a) executives with IT 
background and (b) executives with non-IT background. Project owners with title such as 
CIO, CTO, IT-manager, IS/IT director are identified as executives with IT background. 
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Figure 4.1. Total of Volume of System Integration Contracts Signed During 
1995-2010 
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Whereas project owners with titles such as chief financial officer (CFO), human 
resource (HR), chief marketing officer (CMO) are identified as executives with non-IT 
background (Zhu, Kraemer, & Dedrick, 2004). 
Control variables. The following control variables are used. 
Firm Size: Firm size is usually operationalized using the number of employees or 
firm revenue. In this chapter we used natural log of annual firm revenue (Whitaker, 
Mithas, & Krishnan, 2010).  
Industry Sector: Following the approach of Whitaker et al. (2010) different 
industry sector considered are finance, services, trade and logistics and other industrial. 
Sectors are coded using indicator variables in the regression equation with services-sector 
being treated as the base category. 
Change in GDP: The economy wide exogenous factors such as government 
policies, and state of the economy, recession are one of the strongest determinants of firm 
performance in our sample. To control for this effect we use the natural log of the relative 
change in GDP. This quantity is obtained from BEA in chained 2005 dollars. 
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Table 4.1. Variable Description and Data Sources 
Variable Source Operationalization Deflator 
Change in operating- 
expenses      
 
Change in overhead-
expenses         
 
Change in revenue 
 
               
Sales 
 
 
 
Change in 
profitability  
 
 
Contract value 
 
 
Contract owner  
 
Contract duration  
 
Contract size 
 
 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
IDC 
 
 
IDC 
 
IDC 
 
IDC 
Natural log of relative change 
in operating expenses 
 
Natural log of relative change 
in overhead expenses 
 
Natural log of relative change 
in sales 
 
Natural log of sales 
 
 
 
Natural log of relative change 
in net income 
 
Natural log of contract value- 
defined in the equation 1 
 
Binary variable 
 
Months converted in years 
 
In 2005 constant dollars (in 
millions) 
 
 
2005 implicit 
price deflators 
from BEA 
 
2005 implicit 
price deflators 
from BEA 
 
2005 implicit 
price deflators 
from BEA 
 
2005 implicit 
price deflators 
from BEA 
 
2005 implicit 
price deflators 
from BEA 
 
2005 implicit 
price deflators 
from BEA 
 
Analysis and results. We used log-transformation of variables for the regression 
analysis. The regression equation for the hypothesis H1a is given by the equation: 
  (
                    
                    
)
           (               )        (      )        (
      
      
) 
                            ( ) 
In the above regression equations    takes following binary values: 
   {
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Similarly, for the hypotheses H1b, H2 and H3 the expression of the dependent 
variables take the form as in equation 2, replacing operating expenses by SG&A, sales 
and profit respectively. 
Table 4.2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Sample 
Size 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
ln(Op. Expense Ratio) 112 0.028 0.296 
ln(SG&A Expense Ratio) 74 0.047 0.275 
ln(Contract Value) 112 1.41 1.241 
ln(sale) 112 8.144 1.695 
ln(GDP Ratio) 112 0.006 0.034 
ln(Profit Ratio) 83 0.067 0.828 
ln(Sales Ratio) 112 0.005 0.311 
 
Descriptive statistics. The dataset goes back to 1994, but is comprehensive 
beginning 1995. We therefore start with a sample of all 1317 system integration contracts 
signed between the time periods 1995-2010 in the IDC database. Out of 1317 data points, 
298 observations are usable based on accounting measures obtained from COMPUSTAT.   
The sample size is further reduced to 112 due to incomplete project owner title data. 
Descriptive statistics of the quantitative variables used in the regression model are given 
below: 
In the case of overhead expenses (SG&A), our sample size reduced to 74 
observations, as some of the firms (especially in finance) do not report SG&A separately 
from the overall expenses (operating expenses).  
In the regression model for profit (Table 4.7), it should be noted that the 
dependent variable is not defined when numerator and denominator have opposite signs 
(positive or negative). Hence, the sample is reduced to include only those cases where the 
dependent variable is defined. This reduced the sample size from 112 to 83 for H3.  
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The frequency distribution of the binary variable for the project owner is also 
examined for each level of sector. The frequency table can be found in the appendix 3. 
Table 4.3. Correlation Matrix 
 Ln 
(SG&A r) 
ln(Profit r) ln(Op. Exp.r) ln(Sales r) ln(Contract Val) ln(sale) 
ln(SG&A r)       
ln(Profit r) 0.159 
(0.238) 
     
ln(Op. Exp. r) 0.795 
(<.001) 
0.213 
(0.053) 
    
ln(Sales r) 0.726 
(<.001) 
0.324 
(0.003) 
0.898 
(<.001) 
   
ln(Contract Val) -0.117 
(0.32) 
-0.104 
(0.351) 
0.026 
(0.784) 
-0.045 
 (0.634) 
  
ln(sale) 0.007 
(0.951) 
-0.078 
(0.484) 
0.120 
(0.207) 
 0.016 
 (0.867) 
0.494 
(<.0001) 
 
ln(GDP r) 0.337 
(0.003) 
0.281 
(0.01) 
0.268 
(0.004) 
 0.323 
 (0.0005) 
-0.01843 
(0.847) 
0.184 
(0.051) 
 
The parameters of individual equations are initially estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). Standard assumptions of OLS are examined for each of the regression 
models.  
The analysis is based on economy wide data with high degree of variation in 
contracts and firm sizes. Hence, OLS estimates could yield inaccurate estimates of the 
regression coefficients due to the influence of low-probability events when sample size 
was less than 400 (Starbuck, 2006).  
To address this issue, robust MM regression has been used to limit the effects of 
extreme outliers (Yohai, 1987). In absence of extreme outliers robust MM regression 
produces the same coefficients as OLS. Thus, we also use robust MM estimates to correct 
any possible inconsistencies of OLS estimates. Robust MM regression uses an M-scale 
estimate to scale the regression residuals. In most cases, both OLS and robust MM 
estimates are similar in sign and magnitude. 
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Table 4.4. Parameter Estimates for H1a (n=111) 
Variable Parameter OLS Estimate Robust-MM Estimate 
Intercept     -0.037 
(0.771) 
0.067 
(0.526) 
ln(Contract Value)     0.004 
(0.865) 
0.002 
(0.919) 
Project owner (  )     -0.110** 
(0.033) 
-0.075* 
(0.079) 
Control variable    
ln(sale)     0.033* 
(0.054) 
0.016 
(0.275) 
ln(GDP)     2.013*** 
(0.008) 
2.123*** 
(0.0005) 
Financial  -0.18** 
(0.016) 
-0.127** 
(0.043) 
Trade and Logistics  -0.287*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.205*** 
(0.0009) 
Other industrial  -0.172** 
(0.027) 
-0.186*** 
(0.004) 
R2  0.23 0.13 
R2 (adj)  0.17  
F (model)  4.30 
(0.0003) 
 
  (
                    
                    
)
           (               )        (      )        (
      
      
)             
             
Note: For all the regression results discussed in this paper we used these notations:                        
      
The assumption of normality is checked using the Shapiro-Wilk’s test for 
residuals (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). In some cases this is rejected at the 5% significance 
level. No evidence of heteroscedasticity is found in all the models using White’s test 
(White, 1980). The effect of multicollinearity is examined using variance inflation factor 
(VIF). In all cases, VIF is well within the suggested the limit of 5. Influential outliers are 
detected using Cook’s distance statistic (Cook & Weisberg, 1982). In cases, where the 
removal of an outlier does not bring significant changes in the regression estimate, the 
estimates are determined using the complete sample. In some cases, outlier indication is 
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complemented with exogenous factors; wherever necessary, these cases are discussed in 
detail for each regression model. 
Discussion.  
Cost efficiency model (operating expenses). We started with the complete sample 
to examine the impact of outsourcing contracts and project owners on a firm’s operating 
expenses (equation 2). During OLS analysis, two observations were marked as outliers 
due to high cook’s distance. The closer examination of these two observations revealed 
that they had significant decreases in the operating expenses in the corresponding year.  
 For one of the observations– in the year SI outsourcing contract was signed, a 
“significant” decision on corporate spin-off was also taken. So, it was not included for 
further analysis. For the other observation, no such “significant” event was found for the 
corresponding year, so it was retained in the sample for the analysis. This resulted in a 
sample of size 111 (Table 4.4). 
Project owners with IT background were found to play a significant role in 
reducing the operating expenses in comparison to project owners without any IT 
background. Thus we could infer that project owners with IT background were better 
positioned than project owners with non-IT background to meet their firm’s goal of 
lowering expenses while managing SI outsourcing contracts. However, we did not find 
significant results for the impact of contract value on operating expenses. 
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  Table 4.5. Parameter Estimates for H1b (n=73) 
Variable Parameter OLS Estimate Robust-MM 
Estimate 
Intercept     0.151 
(0.256) 
0.186  
(0.054)* 
ln(Contract Value)     -0.026 
(0.264) 
-0.014  
(0.41) 
Project owner (  )     -0.110** 
(0.045) 
-0.08** 
(0.045) 
Control variable    
ln(sale)     0.016 
(0.361) 
-0.001  
(0.919) 
ln(GDP)     3.006*** 
(0.0005) 
1.320** 
(0.031) 
Financial  -0.118 
(0.134) 
-0.043 
(0.481) 
Trade and Logistics  -0.269*** 
(0.001) 
-0.171*** 
(0.007) 
Other industrial  -0.218*** 
(0.005) 
-0.117** 
(0.048) 
R
2
  0.32 0.14 
R
2 
(adj)  0.25  
F (model)  4.36 
(0.0005) 
 
  (
       
       
)            (               )        (      )        (
      
      
)                           
 
Overhead expenses (SG&A expenses). For the test of hypothesis H1b, during 
OLS analysis, again the same observation dropped above was marked as an outlier due to 
significant decrease in SG&A expenses.  Because of the reason mentioned earlier, it was 
not included for analysis. This led to a reduced sample size of 73 (Table 4.5). 
Similar to the case earlier, we found that the variable project-owner, was 
significant (having stronger significance than for H1a). Thereby suggesting that the IT 
background of project owners could be very effective in managing and monitoring SI 
projects, thus bringing down the overhead expenses of firms. 
Sales. To test hypothesis H2, we examined the impact of project owner on sales 
(Table 4.6). The residual analysis of OLS regression indicated high Cook’s distance 
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statistics for one particular observation, which was then marked as an outlier. We 
performed regression analysis excluding this particular observation, but the overall 
statistical results were similar to the complete sample. Therefore, we reported results for 
hypothesis H2 based on the complete sample.  In this case, effects of both explanatory 
variables (contract value and project owner) were not consistently significant for both 
OLS and robust MM regression. This suggested that overall firm revenue depended on 
various factors apart from outsourcing contracts. The IT background of project owner did 
help to bring down expenses, but their contribution to increase their firm revenues was 
not significant. 
Profitability. For the OLS regression estimates two observations were marked 
with very high Cook’s distance statistics. The year in which outsourcing contract was 
signed, the firm corresponding to one of the observations, had gone through a merger 
which was completed by 2007 (contract year - 2007). So, we excluded this observation 
from our data analysis. 
Table 4.6. Parameter Estimates for H2 (n=112) 
Variable Parameter OLS Estimate Robust-MM Estimate 
Intercept     0.124 
(0.395) 
0.121  
(0.266) 
ln(Contract Value)     -0.073 
(0.21) 
-0.0008  
(0.97) 
Project owner (  )     -0.073* 
(0.058) 
-0.03 
(0.47) 
Control variable    
ln(sale)     0.007 
(0.726) 
0.003 
(0.86) 
ln(GDP)     2.81*** 
(0.0013) 
2.6*** 
(<.0001) 
Financial  -0.236*** 
(0.006) 
-0.181*** 
(0.005) 
Trade and Logistics  -0.25*** 
(0.003) 
-0.172*** 
(0.006) 
Other industrial  -0.093 
(0.294) 
-0.1428** 
(0.0334) 
R2  0.21 0.14 
R2 (adj)  0.15  
F (model)  3.86 
(0.0009) 
 
  (
        
        
)            (               )        (      )        (
      
      
)                          
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The second observation was in a quarter when the corresponding firm took a big 
write-down. Hence, this observation was also excluded from further analysis. The 
following results were observed after eliminating these two observations from regression 
analysis (a) a significant increase in global F-value (significant at p-value=0.05; Table 
4.7) and (b) improvement in adj-R
2
 without any threat of multi-collinearity. Results based 
on this modified sample have been presented in Table 4.7. Again the contributions of 
contract value was not significant. However, surprisingly we found negative significant 
coefficient corresponding to project owner. Project owners of IT systems integration 
projects with non-IT backgrounds significantly improved firm profitability relative to 
project managers with IT backgrounds. 
Table 4.7. Parameter Estimates for H3 (n=81) 
Variable Parameter OLS Estimate Robust-MM 
Estimate 
Intercept     0.476 
(0.238) 
0.49  
(0.15) 
ln(Contract Value)     -0.087 
(0.21) 
-0.043  
(0.453) 
Project owner (  )     -0.304* 
(0.069) 
-0.34** 
(0.018) 
Control variable    
ln(sale)     -0.03 
(0.592) 
-0.029 
(0.537) 
ln(GDP)     5.85** 
(0.021) 
7.24*** 
(0.0007) 
Financial  -0.317 
(0.169) 
-0.31 
(0.11) 
Trade and Logistics  0.098 
(0.67) 
-0.035 
(0.86) 
Other industrial  0.25 
(0.31) 
0.019 
(0.93) 
R
2
  0.19 0.17 
R
2 
(adj)  0.12  
F (model)  2.48 
(0.02) 
 
  (
         
         
)            (              )        (     )        (
      
      
)                         
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Regarding control variables, change in GDP ratio was found significant in almost 
all cases with effects of sector being mixed and firm size not being significant in most 
cases. 
Conclusion and discussion. The present research has been led by the long 
standing question that was posed around two decades before, i.e., does CIO add value 
(Earl & Feeny, 1994)? Although our results were established in a slightly broader context 
to include project owners with IT background; we believe the present research makes 
valuable contribution related to the mechanisms by which the IT backgrounds of project 
owners impact firm performance metrics.   
We found that the IT background of project owner of IT systems integration 
projects did play an important role in reducing costs. But, no significant results were 
found for revenues, and adversely affected the profitability of firms relative to executives 
with non-IT backgrounds.  
Our findings resonates with prior suggestions made by IS researchers regarding 
the increased importance of IT in organizations (Bassellier et al., 2003). In support of IT 
(or technical) background of project owners Rockart, Earl, and Ross (1996) state: 
“The success or failure of an organization's use of IT, however, is only partially 
dependent on the effectiveness of the IT organization. It is even more dependent on the 
capability of line managers at all levels to understand the capabilities of the IT resource 
and to use it effectively.” 
The management of IT is a well-recognized challenge. CEOs often face decisions 
as to how to structure the IT function, including the new role for a CIO (Kambil & Lucas, 
2002). The present research addresses the IT leadership impacts on cost efficiency, 
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revenue and profitability. The IT background of project owner does play a major role in 
reducing costs in an increasingly competitive business environment.  
However, in case of profitability and revenue, our findings were similar to that of 
Aral and Weill (2007), where they found negative or non-significant relationship with IT 
investments on profitability. Among possible reasons for the finding, we conjecture that it 
may be related to project selection. For example, finance executives may be leading 
projects with direct impacts on financial systems and marketing executives may be 
leading projects with direct impacts on marketing. But IT executives may be leading 
more general projects, for example those related to identity management, messaging, and 
billing. Unfortunately, our dataset did not allow for such identification of projects. 
To conclude, our findings suggest that systems integration and other complex IT 
outsourcing contracts that are motivated by cost-reduction concerns should be managed 
by CIOs or executives with IT background. This also calls for a need to provide 
appropriate IT education to executives, to make effective business decisions regarding IT.  
 
Modeling Outsourcing Decisions: An Empirical Analysis of Outsourcing in the US 
Auto Industry 
Introduction. Information technology enabled services (ITES) outsourcing is a 
wide-spread business phenomenon, with the global market for outsourcing of business 
and technology services reaching $315 billion in revenues in 2011, as per Gartner Inc. 
(December 2011). The worldwide IT outsourcing market has grown consistently over the 
last few years. In a recent survey conducted by InformationWeek (Murphy 2012), only 
4% of the 513 business professionals said that they have any plans to decrease their use 
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of IT outsourcing. While, 17% were weighing their options, and the remaining 79% were 
maintaining or increasing their level of outsourcing. The increasing trend towards IT 
outsourcing has been further propelled  by the emergence of cloud computing and 
offshoring activities, with US firms on average spending 14% of their IT budgets on IT 
outsourcing activities (Han et al. 2013). 
In an increasingly globalized and competitive business environment, firms 
experience increased competition in product, service and labor markets with a continuous 
requirement to adapt to new markets and technologies (Slaughter et al. 1996). In this 
context, efficient allocation of resources for IT outsourcing is important because, it can 
free-up a firm’s IT staff for new development. Also, outsourcing can be a potential driver 
of cost reduction by availing vendors’ production cost advantage. In a survey published 
by AMR Research, it has been noted that a majority of outsourcing contracts are driven 
by cost reduction targets (Fersht et al. 2009; Han et al. 2013). 
In prior research, various theoretical perspective and methodologies have been 
used to study outsourcing at individual, project, firm and economy levels (Dibbern et al. 
2004; Whitaker et al. 2010). Whitaker et al. (2010) have presented a survey on various 
theoretical perspectives, and different levels of analysis in IS outsourcing research. The 
theoretical perspectives used in the literature are: Transaction Cost Economics, Agency 
Theory, Theory of Production, Competitive Strategy, Modularity, Learning and 
Capabilities Views, and Systems Dynamics. The detailed discussions on various 
approaches have been provided later. 
Although outsourcing has been widely studied  in the IS literature, including 
being modeled as a diffusion process (Loh et al. 1992b), we use a new perspective to 
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study outsourcing, based on herding behavior.  This perspective is based on an interesting 
observation that CIO decisions are often driven by the objective to maintain industry 
averages of various financial measures (McDonald 2010). 
In this research, we explore the dynamics of ITES outsourcing in the automotive 
sector. This sector has gone through major structural changes in the last decade due to 
various bankruptcy filings, government bailouts and several other austerity measures. In 
the automotive sector in particular, outsourcing has been one of the most widely practiced 
business strategies to bring down IT costs (Dunn 2005; Techweb 2009). 
We model the impact of outsourcing activities of firms using a two-step 
regression approach. Our approach integrates the impact of peer pressure on firms to 
undertake outsourcing activities.  In our first step, we predict outsourcing decision of 
firms, which is then used to predict their selling, general and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses in the second step. The effect of imitative behavior is mediated through the 
outsourcing decision taken by a firm, on its SG&A expenses. To our knowledge, peer-
pressure to model firm behavior is a unique contribution to the outsourcing literature. 
This research builds on  prior research on conformance behavior, using the 
perspectives of Information Based Imitation (Lieberman et al. 2006). According to 
information-based imitation, firms follow other firms that are perceived to have superior 
information. 
Literature review. Outsourcing has been extensively studied in the research 
literature. A review of relevant literature is presented below. Loh et al. (1992a) have 
investigated the determinants of IT outsourcing using business and IT competences as 
represented by various accounting and economic measures. Using factor analysis and 
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multiple-regressions, they find business and IT cost structures to be positively related to 
the degree of outsourcing of a firm, while not observing any significant relationship 
between financial leverage and business performance. Smith et al. (1998) examine the 
financial characteristics of firms that enter into large scale outsourcing contracts. The 
impact of outsourcing contracts have been examined for various accounting measures 
including profitability and SG&A expenses. Chaudhury et al. (1995) investigate the 
process of IT outsourcing, and the various stages involved in it. Considering cost 
reduction as a driving force for outsourcing, they propose a bidding mechanism to reduce 
expected outsourcing costs in the final bidding and vendor selection process. 
Slaughter et al. (1996) have used a labor-market perspective to explain IS 
outsourcing as a response of firms, on the face of increasing costs, and changing 
technological landscape. Soon et al. (1998) empirically investigate the economic 
determinants of IS outsourcing, in terms of production cost, transaction cost and financial 
slack in the context of U. S. banks. Production cost advantages and transaction costs were 
found as major determinants of IS outsourcing. 
In the context of buyer-supplier relationship, Bakos et al. (1993) use economic 
theory of incomplete contracts to determine the optimal strategy of a buyer to  choose the 
number of suppliers for IT services. Koh et al. (2004) discuss the factors responsible for 
the success of IT outsourcing contracts. They explore supplier and customer perspectives 
through the lens of psychological contract of customer and supplier project managers. 
Mithas et al. (2007) assess the influence of non-contractibility on buyers’ use of reverse 
auctions for supplier relationship in the context of outsourcing. In another instance of 
vendor-client relationship, Cha et al. (2009) examine how knowledge parameters 
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characterizing a sourcing relationship between a vendor and a client, interact with 
production and coordination costs, in affecting the business value of alternative 
outsourcing strategies. This is then used to determine a firm’s optimal rate of 
outsourcing.  
Lee et al. (2004) explore the effects of IT outsourcing strategies on outsourcing 
success. They identify three dimensions of outsourcing strategies based on residual rights 
theory: degree of integration, allocation of control, and performance period. 
A system dynamics approach is used by Dutta et al. (2005) to explore the 
mechanics by which different factors interact to produce the observed growth in IT 
offshoring. They use a computational model for a two-country simulation model of 
offshoring. Han et al. (2011)  use economy level panel data to evaluate the contributions 
of spending in IT outsourcing using a production function framework, and find IT 
outsourcing to  make a positive and economically meaningful contribution to industry 
output and labor productivity. 
The impact of the choice of sourcing mechanism on the relation between the 
modularization of business processes and their underlying IT support infrastructure has 
been investigated by Tanriverdi et al. (2007). Their empirical analysis of large and 
medium size U.S. firms reveals that domestic outsourcing is preferred for high 
modularity processes, whereas offshore outsourcing is preferred for processes that are 
low in modularity.  
Ramasubbu et al. (2008) propose a learning-based mediated model of offshore 
software project productivity and quality. In a related study, Harter et al. (2003) 
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investigate the impact of software process improvements on infrastructure costs, 
mediated through software quality.  
Chen et al. (2009)  use a comprehensive coding scheme to capture contract 
provisions in terms of monitoring, dispute resolution, property rights protection, and 
contingency provisions. They investigate the effects of transactional and relational 
characteristics on the specific contractual provisions through transaction cost, agency, 
and relational exchange theories.  
Dey et al. (2010) present a contract-theoretic model to design software 
outsourcing contracts, to explore benefits of fixed-price contracts, and time-and-material 
contracts. They also investigate quality-level agreements and profit-sharing contracts. 
Fitoussi et al. (2012) use the contract-theory framework to examine how objectives and 
incentives are related in IT outsourcing contracts. Using a dataset of outsourcing 
contracts, Susarla et al. (2010) examine whether extensiveness of detailed contracts can 
alleviate holdup, where holdup is described as underinvestment and inefficient bargaining 
by vendor as a result of relationship-specific investment and contract incompleteness. 
In the context of business process outsourcing (BPO), Mani et al. (2010) use the 
lens of information processing view of firms to theorize heterogeneity across BPO 
exchanges, as a function of information capabilities that fit the unique information 
requirements of the exchange. They also provide recommendations on some best 
practices on BPO design and management. Whitaker et al. (2010) use organizational 
learning and capabilities to develop a conceptual model of firm-level characteristics that 
facilitate onshore and offshore BPO. 
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The impact of IT outsourcing on non-IT operating cost has been examined by Han 
et al. (2013) using a framework where internal IT investments moderate the relationship 
between IT outsourcing and non-IT operating costs. Using a panel dataset during the 
period 1999-2003, they find IT outsourcing to reduce non-IT operating costs in firms 
such as SG&A. They also find that higher levels of complementary investments in 
internal IT leads to higher reductions in non-IT operating costs.  
Specific to the automotive industry, Mukhopadhyay et al. (1995) find  the use of 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) improved savings per vehicle. 
From the above review of literature, it could be easily seen that the impact of peer 
pressure on firms to outsource has not been investigated, given that best practices often 
evolve by observing and imitating the behaviors of successful peers. This research uses 
this perspective to make a novel contribution to the literature. 
Theoretical framework. Our hypotheses build on prior results of firm 
profitability, imitation and scale economies. Increased profits enable the firm to invest in 
the changes necessary to expand outsourcing. Peer imitation encourages firms to increase 
or decrease outsourcing, and economies of scale enable outsourcing firms to offer 
services at low costs, which re-inforces the use of outsourcing. 
Firm profits. Firms in competitive environments are under pressure to innovate 
and defend their competitive positions. However, innovations are expensive. The greater 
the profitability of a firm, the greater its ability to take up innovative projects  (Audretsch 
1995; Branch 1974), which allow the firm to launch new products, or develop new 
business processes. Firms with lower profits or losses are likely to try to focus on 
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lowering costs, shedding unviable business lines and finding ways to streamline their 
existing operations (Chastain 1984).  
However, in highly competitive industries such as the auto industry, where profits 
fluctuate from year to year, firms are likely to be reluctant to hire new personnel to staff 
these new projects until the viability of the projects have been demonstrated. Outsourcing 
is a very effective way to staff such new projects (Gilley et al. 2000). Firms can use the 
expertise of outsourcing firms to implement projects quickly, deploy them and evaluate 
their viability. The most successful of such projects, which lead to identifiable long-term 
improvements in business metrics, are likely to lead to the hiring of permanent workers. 
We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: Increased profitability of a firm in a time period, is associated with increased 
outsourcing in the subsequent time period. 
Imitation. The notion of Individuals seeking to conform to the behavior of 
reference groups has been widely used in the economics literature (Benabou 1996; Brock 
et al. 2001; Schelling 1971). Firms imitate each other in the introduction of new services, 
product and processes, in organizational practices and in new investments. Those 
successfully imitating good practices remain competitive and those with inferior 
performance do not survive the competition. Further, both imitation and innovation guide 
firms towards the strategies of best payoffs (Lee et al. 2002).  Business imitation has been 
explained using Information-based Theory by Lieberman et al. (2006). A quick overview 
of this theory is presented below. 
Information Based Imitation. Information based imitation  explain  an 
environment where managers face uncertainty related to  cause-effect relationships  and 
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are often unable to assess the full range of possible outcomes (Lieberman et al. 2006). In 
such an environment, managers use information implicit in others’ action, and may 
imitate others. Imitating others can be understood as a rational behavior, because 
decisions of others may reflect information that one doesn’t have. This is widely 
practiced in an environment characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity.  
Doing what everybody else is doing is termed as herding behavior. A simple 
model is presented  by Banerjee (1992). The economic theory of herding behavior is cast 
in terms of information cascades and social learning (Banerjee 1992; Lieberman et al. 
2006). In  the context of outsourcing, information cascade could occur when a firm 
observing the decision of profitable firms in the peer set, follows their strategy of 
outsourcing activity (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Bikhchandani et al. (1992) argue that 
informational cascade can lead to conformity of behavior among agents. In some cases, 
private information of an individual and her prior experience causes her to imitate the 
action of others (Bikhchandani et al. 1992).  
Social and economic decisions are often influenced by what others are doing 
around us (Banerjee 1992). This interdependence between different decision makers is 
termed as social influence or social learning (Lopez-Pintado et al. 2008). Social learning 
which results in herding or conformity behavior is observed in social, psychological and 
economic phenomena.  
In a phenomenon driven by information based imitation, each agent possesses 
some private information about the state of nature. First an agent acts based purely on her 
private information, but the agent’s actions reveal information to observers. As revealed 
information accumulates, it becomes more rational for observers to discard their private 
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information and mimic the decisions of others (Lieberman et al. 2006). Imitation can also 
be triggered by following the practices of larger rivals and firms with superior 
performances. According to information based imitation, firms with poor performance 
will be tempted to imitate the outsourcing practices of firms with superior performances.  
Imitation is also a response designed to mitigate competitive rivalry (Lieberman 
et al. 2006). In highly competitive industries, the product and process strategies adopted 
by profitable rivals have a higher likelihood of being optimal strategies. Differentiation in 
these markets is likely to lead to sub-optimal outcomes due to uncertainty and 
unpredictability. This is one reason why imitation to mitigate rivalry is most observed 
when firms compete with each other in terms of comparable resources and markets 
(Lieberman et al. 2006).  
Thus, it is hypothesized that firms imitate rivals to maintain competitive parity 
and to gain information from others’ decisions. So the extent of outsourcing adopted by 
other firms within the industry at any given time is taken as optimal level of outsourcing 
within the industry at that time, that would then be imitated. This is expected to manifest 
as a tendency for firms to shift their levels of outsourcing towards industry mean levels of 
outsourcing. We therefore hypothesize that a firm will benchmark its operations against 
industry standards, and will conform to industry best practices on outsourcing levels in 
order to benefit from information conveyed by the competitive environment.  The more a 
firm deviates from these levels, the higher the pressure for conformance with industry 
norms and practices felt by a firm. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
 130 
 
H2: The deviation of a firm’s outsourcing expenses as a proportion of SG&A 
expense (OESGA) from the industry average of OESGA at any given time is inversely 
related to the change in outsourcing activity by the firm. 
Firms often outsource to get the benefits from economies of scale accruing to 
vendors (Han et al. 2011). Due to economies of scale and learning effects (Zimmerman 
1982), vendors can provide IT services to a client at a lower cost than a firm’s internal IT 
department (Han et al. 2011). IT service providers typically serve many clients, so they 
have the opportunity to achieve lower unit costs compared to a single company by 
leveraging fixed costs and achieving economies of scale (Bryce et al. 1998). Since firms 
can achieve immediate cost advantages through IT outsourcing by increasing the 
operational efficiencies of existing processes (Han et al. 2013), it is often considered a 
promising strategy to improve financial performance (Jiang et al. 2006). Reduction in 
non-IT operating expenses, as a result of IT outsourcing has been established previously 
by Han et al. (2013) using a panel data set of approximately 300 U.S. firms from 1999 to 
2003. IT services related expenses of a firm are largely included as a part of SG&A 
expenses. Hence we hypothesize that 
H3: Outsourcing investments of a firm is associated with a decrease in its SG&A 
expenses. 
Empirical model. We use a two stage regression model.  Using the model in 
stage 1, we first estimate a firm’s outsourcing action for the current period, and then 
apply the second stage model to predict the SG&A expense for firms, based on predicted 
outsourcing action. In the first model, we represent action of a firm as a function of its 
profitability and pressure it experiences, in order to maintain the comparable level of 
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OESGA in the industry. The second model relates, SG&A expenses of a firm to its 
current outsourcing level controlling for other factors. Hence, the effects of imitation on a 
firm’s SG&A expense are mediated through the actions taken by the firm. While a firm’s 
decision to increase or decrease its outsourcing level is directly influenced by its profit 
and the mean industry OESGA, these factors only indirectly influence the SG&A 
expenses in our model.  
The model of individual actions to increase or decrease the levels of outsourcing 
for conforming to the mean industry level, builds on the framework provided by (Brock 
et al. 2001), in which, an individual’s action depends directly on the choices of others. 
The presence of interaction among firms induces a tendency for conformity in the 
behavior across agents, in the given reference group. Individual actions are also driven by 
intrinsic factors that differ across agents due to the heterogeneity of individual 
characteristics (Bernheim 1994), captured through individual profitability. The interplay 
of individual heterogeneity and interaction can give rise to complicated behavior of the 
system (Brock et al. 2001). 
The notations used in our model are given in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8. Explanation of Mathematical Notations 
Notation Explanation 
F Index set of agents with cardinality N 
    State of agent   in period   (such as outsourcing level) 
    Action of agent   in period    
(only those observations in which non-zero change in outsourcing level takes place) 
       Selling, general and administrative expenses of agent   in period    
    Peer pressure (mean OESGA) experienced by agent   in period    
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Basic unit of analysis is a firm in the automotive industry. The state of firms is 
described by a     state vector,    for   firms, where     denotes the state (i.e., 
outsourcing level) of the     agent (firm) at time  . At every time period  , an agent   
chooses an action: to update its state. We define an action     of an agent   at time period 
  as the change in the state (i.e., non-zero change in outsourcing level) of the agent from 
the previous time period,    . In other words, if between two consecutive years, the 
state of an agent doesn’t change, then the agent does not take action during that period of 
observation. 
In (1), we model an agent’s actions as a function of its previous profit-margin and 
peer pressure the agent experiences due to outsourcing activities of other firms. Firms 
often imitate other firms in the industry, especially when the imitation relates to adopting 
some of the best practices. As an example, a firm’s decision to outsource a business 
function could be driven by the success stories of outsourcing experienced by similar 
firms. 
The peer pressure term in (1) can be understood as the deviation from the mean 
OESGA of peers. 
          
          
           
    (
     
        
      )                 ( ) 
We conceptualize this effect of peer pressure for an agent  , as per the following 
expression:  
    
 
   
(∑
   
         
   
)              ( ) 
Action corresponds to non-zero observations and is given by, 
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    {
                            
   (     )                  
        ( ) 
SG&A expenses of firms are estimated using the following equation: 
  (        )          (      )       (        )       (    )                 ( ) 
A log-linear specification has been used to incorporate the effects of economies of 
scale experienced by a client through outsourcing contracts (Harter et al. 2003; Hitt et al. 
2002). In (4), we control for previous SG&A level and GDP. The parameter estimates 
obtained from (1) have been used to estimate a firm’s action in (4). 
Data and measures. Data on outsourcing contracts of firms in the automotive 
sector was obtained from IDC BuyerPulse deals database, which is the largest database 
for outsourcing contracts and has data on outsourcing contracts signed by US companies 
during the period of: 1995 – 2010 (reference). In this study, we use data for automotive 
firms from the database, which enter into multiple outsourcing contracts during the 
aforementioned period. Different kinds of contracts signed by firms include but not 
limited to: Application Management, Business Process Outsourcing, Custom Application 
Development, IS Outsourcing, Network and Desktop Outsourcing and System 
Integration. 
To supplement the data from IDC database, news wire services at LexisNexis was 
also searched during the time period of 1995-2011, using terms: “information 
technology”, “information systems”, “outsource”, “outsourcing” and “company Name”. 
In total, there were 107 contracts. 
The data from IDC and news wire search was supplemented with accounting 
measures of firms obtained from COMPUSTAT. The accounting measures for some of 
the firms were not available for the complete period of 1995-2010. Hence, a subset of 
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outsourcing contracts was created to match the corresponding accounting measures. The 
data for implicit price deflators and the economy wide gross domestic product (GDP) was 
obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
We were interested in those years for analysis, when a firm’s outsourcing level 
changed.  This condition further reduced the sample size to 60 observations. From these 
60 observations, the data points for the last contract year were used for holdout sample, to 
determine the predictive ability of empirical model. The remaining 50 observations were 
used for training set to develop the regression model. 
Measures. We describe below the methodology to calculate the outsourcing state of a 
firm in a given year. 
Based on the information on contract value and contract length, the dollar value of 
a specific contract was divided by its contract length (in years), and then summed over all 
the active contracts a firm had in a given year. Hence, the total contract value for     firm 
in year   was given by:  
                (   )  ∑ (
                             
                           
)
                       
 
The summary of constructs used in the analysis is provided in Table 4.9. Note, all 
quantities were converted to 2005 constant million dollars. 
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Table 4.9. Variable Description and Data Sources 
Variable Source Units Deflator 
 
 Revenue 
 
 
 
Profit  
 
 
Contract value 
 
 
Contract duration  
 
Selling general & 
administrative 
expenses 
 
GDP 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
IDC and News wire 
 
 
IDC 
 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
BEA 
 
Million dollars 
 
 
 
Million dollars 
 
 
Million dollars 
 
 
Months converted in 
years 
 
Million dollars 
 
Million dollars 
 
2005 implicit price 
deflators from BEA 
 
 
2005 implicit price 
deflators from BEA 
 
2005 implicit price 
deflators from BEA 
 
 
 
2005 implicit price 
deflators from BEA 
 
2005 implicit price 
deflators from BEA 
 
 
Analysis and results. The descriptive statistics of variables used in modeling is given in 
Table 4.10.  
For (1), we analyzed the scatter plot of the dependent variable against both 
independent variables. Few observations were identified as outliers. First OLS regression 
was performed to investigate the different modeling assumptions.  Very low R-square 
value was obtained using OLS regression.  Further, the assumption of normality of 
residuals was strongly rejected (       ) using Shapiro-Wilk’s test. When the normality 
assumptions are violated, the regression equation may generate unreliable p-value or t-
statistics (Schwab et al. 2011). Based on the Durbin-Watson and Durbin-H tests, we 
found no first order autocorrelation among residuals. The White’s test showed no 
evidence of heteroskedasticity of residuals. 
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Table 4.10. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Pearson correlation coefficients are reported, with the p-values are given in the brackets. 
When normality assumption of residuals is violated, robust regression procedures 
are used to mitigate the effects of unusual observations, as the estimates from robust 
regression are more reliable (Stuart 2011). These robust regression methods behave like 
traditional methods when data satisfy the assumptions of those models, but behave 
differently when data violate the assumptions such as: normality, and homoscedasticity. 
One of such widely used robust regression techniques is robust-MM regression (Schwab 
et al. 2011; Stuart 2011).  MM-estimators combine the high asymptotic relative efficiency 
of M-estimators with the high breakdown of a class of S-estimators. Hence MM estimates 
have properties of both robust regression M-estimates and S-estimates. ‘MM’ refers to 
multiple M-estimates carried out in the computation of the estimator. We used robust 
MM regression to test hypotheses, and the estimates can be seen in Table 4.11 and Table 
4.12. 
 
 
Variable Mean 
(s. d.) 
Profit/revenue Peer 
factor 
Action Current 
State 
SG&A GDP  
(in 
billions) 
Profit/revenue 0.004 
(0.160) 
      
Peer factor 0.004 
(0.09) 
-0.007 
(0.95) 
     
Action  58.283 
(562.664) 
0.007 
(0.9613) 
-0.09 
(0.55) 
    
Current State 903.31 
(1439) 
0.100 
(0.489) 
0.72 
(<.01) 
0.185 
(0.196) 
   
SG&A 8272 
(8410) 
0.053 
(0.713) 
0.5 
(<.01) 
0.129 
(0.370) 
0.872 
(<.01) 
  
GDP  
(in billions) 
12130 
(939.463) 
-0.038 
(0.789) 
-0.352  
(0.01) 
-0.439 
(<.01) 
-0.3 
(0.03) 
-0.197 
(0.17) 
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Table 4.11. Parameter Estimates for Action (Equation 1) 
Parameter Estimate Std Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept (  ) 14.06 5.47 6.6 0.01 
Profit margin (  ) 381.54*** 99.73 14.64 <.01 
PeerFactor (  ) 141.44** 61.96 5.21 0.02 
R-square = .023     
 
For (1), we found that higher level of profit margin (profit/revenue) was related to 
higher level of outsourcing ( 
 
              ). Further, higher the effect of peer 
pressure for outsourcing, the more likely firms were to outsource ( 
 
              ). 
Table 4.12. Parameter Estimates for Equation 2 
Parameter   Estimate Standard Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept (  ) 5.41 2.6 4.25 0.04 
ln(SG&A) (  )    1.02*** 0.02 4542.88 <.01 
ln(updated state) (  ) -0.02* 0.01 3 0.08 
ln(GDP) (  ) -0.34** 0.16 4.43 0.04 
R-square = .73      
 
In (4), we controlled for SG&A expenses from the previous year to account for 
firm-specific factors that affect SG&A in the current period (Harter et al. 2003; Reger et 
al. 1994). We also controlled for gross domestic product of US economy, to account for 
economy-wide factors. 
For (4) used in predicting the selling general and administrative expenses 
(SG&A), we found that investments in outsourcing led to decrease in SG&A 
expenses ( 
 
            ). Also the lagged value of SG&A expenses strongly 
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influenced the current SG&A level (  
 
            ). GDP negatively influenced the 
SG&A expenses (                ) in the automotive industry. 
Accuracy prediction on the holdout dataset. Holdout dataset consisted of all 
contracts signed by firms in the sample, in the year corresponding to the last contract 
announced by a firm. In total, there were 10 contracts. The mean accuracy of estimation 
was calculated using mean magnitude of relative error (Agrawal et al. 2007), and was 
defined in the following way:  
       
∑ |
                        
          |     
 
   
 
 
To assess the predictive ability of model introduced in the present research, first 
MMRE metric for the two-step regression was obtained.  We then calculated MMRE 
metric, when future SGA for each firm was estimated using the following heuristic
10
: 
“mean of all observations corresponding to SG&A expenses for a particular firm in the 
training-set”. The MMRE for our two step regression and the mean SG&A estimates 
were: 12.47 and 53.25 respectively, clearly demonstrating the improvement in predicting 
SGNA over mean SG&A heuristic, the proposed method in the present research provides. 
Contributions and implications. This study makes important contribution to the 
IS literature in following ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, it is one of the first 
studies that empirically investigates the outsourcing behavior of firms through the lens of 
social influence and peer pressure. It establishes that outsourcing among automotive 
firms lead to reductions in SG&A expenses. It also suggests that outsourcing plays a 
major role in fulfilling CEOs’ objectives to cut IT spending (Murphy 2012).  
                                                          
10
 Loosely it can be understood as moving average estimate for each firm. 
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Second, this research complements the previous literature on the impact of IT 
outsourcing (Han et al. 2011; Han et al. 2013), albeit, through a different theoretical 
perspective. We believe that the use of Information-Based Imitation to explain herding 
behavior of firms in the IT outsourcing context is a novel theoretical contribution IS 
literature, and it can be adapted to explain various business imitation processes. 
In an increasingly competitive environment, where automotive firms such as GM 
and Ford are investing heavily on consolidating data centers and applications, 
centralizing IT planning and execution, maintaining privacy of customer data, and 
bringing various IT services in-house to cut cost and improve firm profit, our research 
has important implications as we show, that outsourcing has indeed positively contributed 
to bringing down the SG&A expenses of firms.  
In the case of automotive firms, where up to 90% of different IT services are 
provided by outsourcing vendors (Murphy 2012), making restructuring decision of IT 
services calls for careful analysis by managers.  By not availing the market oriented 
services, firms often lose the expertise of IT service providers, and face the risk of 
eroding their competitive advantage to manage operating costs.  
The herding behavior approach taken in this research can be extended to study a 
variety of network and social influence phenomena. For instance, Oh et al. (2007) have 
used the herding behavior perspective to understand the membership dynamics in the 
open source software community. In an environment, where world is becoming closely 
interlinked due to the wider penetration of social media and web-services, modeling  the 
herding behavior of agents to study IT driven phenomena will have important 
implications for policies and business issues. 
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When firms imitate each other for any phenomenon such as outsourcing, in an 
uncertain environment, they reduce the risk of falling behind rivals. Thus, imitation can 
spur productive innovation, or amplify the error of early movers (Lieberman et al. 2006). 
Herding behavior can also lead to bubbles, and waste of resources in mimicking others’ 
strategies (Lieberman et al. 2006). Recent financial crisis and internet boom of the late 
90’s are some examples of this. Hence, deeper analysis of outsourcing phenomena via the 
herding behavior perspective, on other measures of firm, could be possible extensions of 
current research. 
Investigating cases where agents with sufficiently extreme preferences do not 
conform to industry norms, yet are still able to successfully manage their operations, can 
be another possible extension of the current research. Finally, weighing the actions of 
peers based on some similarity metrics (Segev et al. 1999), to model the herding behavior 
among agents can provide us with fresh insights  on the conforming behavior of firms.  
Finally, we note that the phenomena of herd behavior and peer influence are also 
modeled through agent-based simulation (Lewis, Gonzalez, & Kaufman, 2012; Oh & 
Jeon, 2007; Zhao et al., 2011). The extension of the current research, through the 
simulation based approach of imitation model, in the context of outsourcing, can provide 
novel insights into outsourcing behavior of firms. 
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Appendix 1: Proofs 
Table 5.1A. Summary of terms used in analytical modeling 
Term Definition 
    Initial natural count of the article-a 
   Initial natural count of the article-b 
  Total number of iterations 
  Probability that a reader reads recommended article upon arrival 
    Probability that a reader reads un-recommended article upon arrival 
  
  The count of article-a in hard cutoff NRS, after   iterations 
   
 
 The count of article-a in probabilistic NRS when     at every time step, after   iterations 
   
 
 The count of article-a in probabilistic NRS when     at every time step, after   iterations 
  (    ) Probability of article-a being read in probabilistic NRS at time   
        Probabilities of article-a and article-b being recommended in probabilistic NRS 
   (    )=       Probability of article-a being read in probabilistic NRS when     at every time step 
   (    )      Probability of article-a being read in probabilistic NRS when     at every time step 
   Total count of articles ‘a’ and ‘b’ after   iterations 
   Random variable defined as       
  
  
 
 
   Probability of recommended article being read in 2
nd user model 
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Proposition 1. Let   
  represents the count of article-a after     iteration in hard 
cutoff NRS. Then  
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Proposition 2. First the expression for  (   
 
) has been derived.  
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At any time   we have the recurrence relation 
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Taking expectation on both sides and using the property of conditional expectation  
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Using the transformation,    
     
  
 
 results in following relation 
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) (  ) or  (  )  (  
 
    
) (    )                    ( )     
Iteratively using the recurrence relation (5) results in 
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                                                                    ( ) 
Using the relation           for     the expression in (6) results in  
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Substituting values      
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Finally, we have   (   
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                ( ) 
Now, we derive the expression for  (   
 ). 
Probability of article-a being read at time   and hence probability of increase in 
the count of the article-a at any given time   
is    (    )                                               ( )    
Suppose                   be the time indices when an article-  
was read by a reader. Then the probability of this particular string will be given by  
(
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)     (
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These indices can be chosen in ( 
 
) ways so, probability of having an article-    
being read   times and hence    
       is given by 
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The expressions ∑  (   
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    has been 
calculated separately.  From the result in equation (9) we have, 
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Using the property   (  )   (
   
   ), the expression earlier takes the following form 
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Appendix 1(continued) 
The last expression in equation (11) is the total selection probability of either of 
the articles in’      iterations but with the initial counts of      and   for the article 
a and b respectively.  
So expression in (10) becomes,  
 (   
 )      
  
     
 
  
     
(       )                                  (  ) 
Proposition 4.   (  
  )  ∑ (    ) 
 (   )   (      )
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Appendix 2: Sensitivity Analysis 
In case of news articles, where majority of queries are driven by front page 
display or recommended articles, we expect popularity to exhibit some kind of power law 
distribution. The rationale for power-law distribution of popularity, especially in web-
based systems, has been suggested by Easley and Kleinberg (2010). This assumption of 
popularity is also consistent with the effect of social influence discussed by Salganik, et 
al. (2006). In their experiment for artificial music market, they found that in the presence 
of social influence, such as media sites, we observe greater inequality – popular entities 
are more popular and unpopular entities are less popular. From a given power-law 
distribution its corresponding Zipf distribution can also be obtained (Adamic 2000). 
To validate the popularity distribution of articles, we obtained data on popularity 
of articles from DailyMe Inc., a company that provides news personalization technology 
to a large number of media sites. There are five datasets from five different local news 
websites serving markets in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New York, Colorado and 
Massachusetts, collected during the period of February 2012 to April 2012. The data 
provided listed specific articles along with cookie IDs and time stamps read across the 
five different local news websites.  
Figure 5.2A shows the normalized frequency distribution on a log-log scale using 
the logarithmic binning with multiplier of 2 – similar to the procedure described by 
Newman (2005). The X-axis corresponds to natural log value of bins and Y-axis 
corresponds to the natural log value of normalized frequencies. Data from these five real 
local news websites show the pattern of power-law in popularity. Based on the findings,  
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
the power-law exponent used to discuss results in the sensitivity analysis is given 
by      . We used this exponent value in the modified simulation model, where the 
initial distribution of article counts was generated using power-law distribution with 
exponent 1.7. We note that these are relatively smaller local news Web sites and we do 
not therefore make broader generalizations about the power law based on these alone. 
However, it provides valuable insights for this sensitivity analysis.   
The probability density function of power law is given by  ( )   
 
  
, for some 
exponent   and the constant of proportionality  .  ( ) represents the fraction of articles 
which have popularity  . Cumulative distribution of power law follows Zipf’s law 
(Newman 2005). The Zipf’s probability mass function of an article ranked  , when the 
total number of articles in the system is , is given by: 
 (     )   
 
  ⁄
∑ (   ⁄ )
 
   
 
In the above expression the value of   characterizes the behavior of the system. 
Further, between a given Zipf’s distribution and its corresponding power law distribution 
the following relation holds between the exponents     
 
 
 (Adamic 2000). We will 
use this relation between exponents in the simulation model. 
Empirical analysis of popularity distribution of articles. Figure 5.1A depicts 
the histogram plot for the popularity of articles on each of the five sites. In all cases 
popularity distribution is L-shaped. The X axis is article counts, binned in intervals of 
width 100. The Y axis is the number of news articles in the period that have the 
corresponding count.  
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Further we plotted the normalized frequency distribution on log-log scale using 
the logarithmic binning with multiplier of 2 – similar to the procedure described by 
Newman (2005). Findings in this case are produced in the Figure 5.2A, with the slope of 
curves. X-axis corresponds  
Figure 5.1A. Distribution of the number of articles receiving a given number of 
counts. To plot the histogram, X-axis has been binned in the intervals of length 100. 
Y-axis corresponds to the number articles falling in that range. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
to natural log value of bins and Y-axis corresponds to the natural log value of normalized 
frequencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2A. log-log plot for popularity of articles at five different sites 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
Data from these five real local news websites show the pattern of power-law in 
popularity. Based on the findings, the exponent used to discuss results in the sensitivity 
analysis is given by       Hence for the simulation model that follows, the value of   is 
given by      . 
Simulation setup. In this case initially articles were assigned random counts 
between 0 and 1000 generated using Zipf distribution with the exponent of 1.4. Further, 
as before the difference in the counts of     and (   )   article was kept to be 1. 
Other simulation parameters remain same as in the case on uniform distribution with 
     . This particular choice of   has been chosen to illustrate the case with influential 
NRS. 
 
 
The count of the selected articled is increased by 1. For the recommended articles 
(i.e. DL), we follow the selection process based on two user models. In the first user 
model a recommended article is selected randomly. Whereas in the second user model a  
 
Figure 5.3A. Sample simulation path for boundary amplification 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
recommended article is selected based on linear decrease in selection probability of the 
recommended articles. In both cases, the count of selected article is increased by 1. 
The discussion in this section is based on findings that resulted after running the 
simulation model multiple times. One sample path in each case is produced in the figures 
5.3A, 5.4A & 5.5A.  
Figure-5.3A shows that the issue of count amplification between Nth and (N+1)th 
article still exists in the modified simulation setup. The issue of count amplification 
(based on M1) for the hardcutoff scenario was observed for both reader models. Also in 
the probablisitic selection mechansim, the path of M1 stays close to its initial value (i.e. 
~0) for both reader model.  
Comparing to the results in the case of the uniform distribution considered before, 
one difference is in terms of the highest value M1 takes at the end of simulation. But this 
is mainly due to difference in the initial distribution of articles. In case of power-law, the 
inital counts of 10th and 11th article were almost 4 times lower than in the case of 
uniform distribution. Besides this the findings remain consistent - for probabilistic 
mechanism, in presence of the second reader model, M1 has random fluctuations close to 
its initial value – similar to the observation in case of uniform distribution. 
Manipulation. We consider two cases of manipulation that are of major interest: 
(i) early little (10, 100) and (ii) early heavy – (50, 100). Overall findings for manipulation 
remain similar to our prior findings, although the benefits of manipulation appear slightly 
lower for the manipulator. When popularity of articles follow power-law, coupled with 
increasingly focused attention for the top ranked articles, even in the recommended  
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
articles (user model-2), we observe that to make manipulation activity successful, 
requires substantially more clicks to maintain higher popularity of the target article in 
some cases (right panel, Figure 5.4A & 5.5A). For example in Figure 5.5A (right panel) – 
even the case of heavy early manipulation, results do not appear to be as encouraging for 
a manipulator as in the case of uniform distribution. Earlier, for the case of heavy 
manipulation in presence of uniform distribution (Figure 3.8), once a manipulator 
stopped the manipulation activity, he was able to leverage self-reinforcing nature of 
hardcutoff. While that phenomenon still exists here (the downtrend in M1 continues), the 
trend is less pronounced than was the case under the uniform distribution. However the 
consistent theme remains – probabilistic selection continues to offer benefits in terms of 
offering significant resistance to manipulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4A. Little early manipulation for Zipf distribution 
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Appendix 2 (Continued)  
Figure 5.5A. Heavy early manipulation for Zipf distribution 
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Appendix 3: Frequency Table 
 
Table 5.2A. Frequency Table 
 Other 
industries 
Retail  
and trade  
Finance  Services 
Non IT background-profit 8 22 13 10 
IT background-profit 10 6 6 8 
Non IT background-op exp. 11 27 21 12 
IT background-op exp. 12 11 7 11 
Non IT background-SG&A 10 7 4 9 
IT background-SG&A 11 12 14 7 
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